




INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO FORECLOSURES:   







This Article argues that the current foreclosure crisis 
illustrates how economic stability and racial justice are 
intertwined.  Recent research has found that the more racially 
segregated a metropolitan region is, the higher the number and 
rate of its foreclosures.  Indeed, the high levels of racial 
residential segregation in the U.S. facilitated discriminatory 
and abusive lending practices and contributed to instability in 
regional housing markets.  The Article contends that current 
fair housing laws alone are insufficient to dismantle the 
economic and political structures that continue to produce 
segregation, particularly the architecture of fragmented and 
unequal local governments competing with each other for 
resources.  Responses to foreclosures provide an opportunity to 
chip away at these incentives for segregation by encouraging 
regional collaboration and shared-equity homeownership 
structures.  Two promising examples of such collaboration are 
examined: first, a partnership between local governments and 
non-profits conducting targeted redevelopment through the 
federal Neighborhood Stabilization Program; and, second, a 
joint effort by a community development financial institution 
and a community development corporation to buy portfolios of 
distressed notes at a discount in order to rehabilitate scattered-
site properties as affordable housing.  Building on these 
examples, the Article proposes that the next significant step 
toward creating durable solutions is for municipalities to 
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support shared-equity homeownership structures designed to 
create permanent affordability and neighborhood stability.  
Innovative responses to foreclosures from federal, state, and 
local policymakers hold the promise of advancing both 
economic security and racial justice. 
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The United States is currently experiencing a level of 
foreclosures not seen since the Great Depression, with broad 
impacts on families and neighborhoods across the country.  At the 
current rate, banks will repossess more than one million homes in 
2010 and initiate foreclosure proceedings on three million more—
approximately one in every forty-five homes.1  One in nine 
homeowners is more than sixty days delinquent on their mortgage2 
and twenty-three percent of homeowners owe more in mortgage 
debt than their home is worth.3 
This Article argues that one of the causes of the current 
foreclosure crisis is the high-level of residential segregation that 
persists in the United States.  Residential patterns in the United 
States are currently even more segregated by race and class than they 
were a century ago.4  This segregation simultaneously has facilitated 
and has been perpetuated by the creation of a two-tiered financial 
services sector offering separate and unequal products in different 
neighborhoods and to different consumers.5  This two-tiered 
                                                                                                       
1  Realtytrac, 1.65 Million Properties Receive Foreclosure Filings in First Half 
of 2010 (July 15, 2010), available at http://www.realtytrac.com/content/ 
foreclosure-market-report/165-million-properties-receive-foreclosure-filings-
in-first-half-of-2010-5877. 
2  Press Release, Mortg. Bankers Ass‟n, Mortgage Bankers 
Association National Delinquency Study (Feb. 19, 2010), available at http://  
www.mbaa.org/NewsandMedia/PressCenter/71891.htm.  
3  Ruth Simon & James R. Hagerty, One in Four Borrowers is Under 
Water, WALL ST. J., Nov. 14, 2009, at A1. 
4  Douglas S. Massey, Origins of Economic Disparities: The Historical Role of 
Housing Segregation, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA 39, 42-
52 (James H. Carr & Nandinee K. Kutty eds., 2009); KEVIN GOTHAM, RACE, 
REAL ESTATE, AND UNEVEN DEVELOPMENT 27-70 (2002). 
5  The Department of Justice has uncovered significant evidence of 
patterns and practices of redlining, discriminatory underwriting, and 
discriminatory pricing by various lenders.  As examples of redlining, see United 
States v. Chevy Chase Fed. Sav. Bank, No. 94 Civ. 1824 (D.D.C. 1994) 
(bringing suit against Chevy Chase Bank for failing to market and refusing to 
make loans in predominantly non-white neighborhoods); United States v. 
Albank, FSB, No. 97 Civ. 1206 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (charging Albank with 
violations of the Fair Housing Act (FHA) and Equal Credit Opportunity Act 
(ECOA) for refusing to make loans in particular cities where the majority of 
African American and Latino residents in its lending region lived).  Regarding 
underwriting discrimination and evidence that banks were not providing the 
same assistance to African American and Latino applicants that they were 
providing to white applicants, see United States v. Decatur Fed. Sav. & Loan 
Assoc., No. 92 Civ. 2198 (N.D. Ga. 1992), United States v. Northern Trust Co., No. 
95 Civ. 3239 (N.D. Ill. 1995), United States v. First Nat’l Bank of Dona Ana Cnty., 
 
2011  COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW 66 
  
 
structure of financial services contributed to the mass-marketing of 
subprime financial products.  These financial products were then the 
catalyst for the high rates of foreclosures and subsequent credit 
crisis that began in 2007. 
A clearer understanding of the roots of the current housing 
crisis creates new urgency for the effort to dismantle the structures 
that entrench segregation.  While continuing discrimination remains 
significant, the most powerful force perpetuating segregation is the 
current structure of fragmented, unequal local governments that are 
highly dependent on local tax revenues.  This structure encourages 
municipalities to compete with each other to attract investment and 
to exclude those who may require services or be seen as reducing 
property values.  The existing distribution of strong land use powers 
to local governments, coupled with minimal restrictions on their 
ability to exclude based on wealth, simultaneously perpetuates 
segregation and shields municipalities from liability.  More robust 
protections against discrimination within the current compliance-
based model of accountability, while beneficial, can go only so far in 
unraveling this persistent segregation, which has been legally woven 
into the existing structures of local governance and fiscal policy.  
Anti-discrimination laws alone can neither level the unequal 
economic footing on which different local governments stand nor 
proscribe the legally-sanctioned exclusionary practices of many 
municipalities.6 
An effective response to foreclosures, therefore, must 
address both the governance structures that have entrenched 
segregation and the current home ownership and financing 
structures that have encouraged speculation.  The housing crisis 
creates new opportunities to look at local models in order to foster 
collaboration across municipal lines, as well as innovative methods 
to reduce speculation and to make homes the stable and secure 
                                                                                                       
No. 97 Civ. 96 (D.N.M. 1997), and United States v. Shawmut Mortg. Co., No. 93 
Civ. 2453 (D. Conn. 1993).  Regarding pricing discrimination and evidence that 
loan officers were charging higher up-front fees for home mortgage loans to 
African American and Latino borrowers than whites or encouraging loan 
officers and independent mortgage brokers to use discretionary pricing in a 
discriminatory manner, see United States v. Huntington Mortg. Co., No. 95 Civ. 
2211 (N.D. Ohio 1995).  See also United States v. Fleet Mortg. Corp., No. 96 
Civ. 2279 (E.D.N.Y 1996); United States v. Long Beach Mortg. Co., No. 96 
Civ. 6159 (C.D. Cal. 1996). 
6  Most common among these exclusionary practices is the use of 
zoning laws to increase the cost of housing and limit rental units. See Rolf 
Pendall, Local Land Use Regulation and the Chain of Exclusion, 66 J. AM. PLAN. 
ASS'N 125, 125 (2000).  See also infra note 11. 
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long-term investment buyers hope for.  Working to prevent and 
respond to foreclosures also should be understood as an 
opportunity to begin to dismantle segregation by focusing on 
regional solutions and on stable alternative homeownership 
structures. 
After briefly summarizing the roots of housing segregation 
throughout the twentieth century, Part II of this Article reviews the 
most recent comprehensive study of contemporary housing 
discrimination.  Part III analyzes the way in which the current 
segregated metropolitan pattern was central in enabling the 
foreclosure crisis.  Part IV analyzes the limitations of existing fair 
housing laws, which are characterized by ad hoc enforcement and 
weak penalties that together fail to effectively deter violations.  It 
also considers the obstacles to creating regional remedies in light of 
two recent fair housing cases, Thompson v. United States Department of 
Housing & Urban Development7 and United States ex rel. Anti-
discrimination Center of Metro New York, Inc. v. Westchester County.8  
Given the limited ability of existing fair housing laws to address 
entrenched segregation, Part V examines the economic assumptions 
that undergird current structures of local governance and advances 
two main critiques of these dominant assumptions.  Part VI then 
puts forward an innovative regional collaboration that has 
developed to address foreclosures in the Essex County, New Jersey 
metropolitan area, and discusses shared-equity forms of home 
ownership that cities are considering in response to the foreclosure 
crisis. 
 
II. RACIAL DISCRIMINATION AND RESIDENTIAL 
SEGREGATION 
 
A. The Historical Roots of Residential Segregation 
 
Over the past century, segregation was established and 
perpetuated through a combination of both public and private 
actions.  One of the leading scholars in the field, Douglas Massey, 
concludes that “white Americans made a series of deliberate 
historical decisions to deny blacks full access to urban housing and 
to enforce their spatial isolation in society.”9  White mob violence 
against integrated neighborhoods in the late 1890‟s and early 1900‟s 
                                                                                                       
7  348 F. Supp. 2d 398 (D. Md. 2005).  
8  No. 06 Civ. 2860, 2009 WL 455269 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 24, 2009).  
9  Massey, supra note 4, at 39. 
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drove African Americans from their homes10 and was reinforced by 
municipal zoning restrictions excluding African Americans from 
white neighborhoods.11  In 1948, after the National Association for 
the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) challenged these 
racially-based zoning provisions and the Supreme Court found them 
unconstitutional,12 private neighborhood improvement associations 
implemented racially restrictive covenants to take their place.13  
After the 1930‟s, the most significant force intensifying segregation 
                                                                                                       
10  Id. at 53-54.  In multiple cities around the United States, whites led 
racial assaults against African Americans in multiracial neighborhoods—
destroying black homes, terrorizing black residents, and creating new and rigid 
borders between black and white communities.  See THOMAS W. HANCHETT, 
SORTING OUT THE NEW SOUTH CITY: RACE, CLASS AND URBAN 
DEVELOPMENT IN CHARLOTTE 1875-1975 (1998); JAMES W. LOEWEN, 
SUNDOWN TOWNS: A HIDDEN DIMENSION OF AMERICAN RACISM 90-115 
(2005); C. VANN WOODWARD, THE STRANGE CAREER OF JIM CROW (1955). 
11  Cities and towns throughout the South and Midwest passed zoning 
ordinances to legally establish separate white and black neighborhoods.  For 
instance, in 1914, Louisville, Kentucky passed “ „[a]n ordinance to prevent 
conflict and ill-feeling between the white and colored races in the City of 
Louisville, and to preserve the public peace and promote the general welfare, 
by making reasonable provisions requiring, as far as practicable, the use of 
separate blocks for residences, places of abode and places of assembly by 
white and colored people respectively.‟ ”  Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 70 
(1917).  See A. Leon Higginbotham, Jr. et al., De Jure Housing Segregation in the 
United States and South Africa:  The Difficult Pursuit for Racial Justice, 1990 U. ILL. L. 
REV. 763, 807-62 (1991); Garett Power, Apartheid Baltimore Style:  The Residential 
Segregation Ordinances of 1910-1913, 42 MD. L. REV. 289 (1983); Roger L. Rice, 
Residential Segregation by Law, 1910-1917, 34 J. S. HIST. 179 (1968). 
12  The NAACP filed suit to challenge the state enforcement of 
segregation, and the Supreme Court found these laws unconstitutional in 1917.  
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).  Nevertheless, many municipalities 
continued to adopt and enforce racially restrictive zoning agreements well into 
the 1940‟s. See Monk v. City of Birmingham, 185 F.2d 859 (5th Cir. 1950) 
(invalidating ordinance Birmingham passed in 1949 implementing racial zoning 
statutes dating to 1926); Baker v. City of Kissimmee, 645 F. Supp. 571, 579 
(M.D. Fla.1986) (pointing out that Kissimmee continued to enforce a racial 
zoning ordinance into the 1940‟s); State v. Wilson, 25 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1946) 
(striking down racial zoning ordinance enacted by Dade County in 1945). 
13  The typical racially restrictive covenant was similar to that struck 
down in Shelley v. Kraemer, which stated that “ „no part of said property or any 
portion thereof shall be . . . occupied by any person not of the Caucasian race, 
it being intended hereby to restrict the use of said property for said period of 
time against the occupancy as owners or tenants of any portion of said 
property for resident or other purpose by people of the Negro or Mongolian 
Race.‟ ” Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1948). The Federal Housing 
Authority recommended the use of racially restrictive covenants until 1950.  
Massey, supra note 4, at 55-56.  
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nationally was the growth of suburbs, combined with the 
discriminatory loan-underwriting standards created by the Federal 
Home Owners Loan Corporation, which were adopted by the 
Federal Housing Authority and almost universally used by the 
banking industry.14  Through the purchase of subsidized suburban 
homes, post-war white homebuyers “came to accept as natural the 
conflation of whiteness and property ownership with upward social 
mobility,” and they also created new collective identities united on 
issues of property taxation and racial segregation.15  These collective 
identities were reinforced further by the creation of local 
government boundaries (through processes of municipal 
incorporation or secession) that divided on the basis of race and 
                                                                                                       
14  The four-tiered underwriting system developed by the Federal 
Home Owners Loan Corporation (HOLC) in the early 1930‟s systematically 
undervalued racially mixed neighborhoods and strongly discouraged lending in 
integrated or primarily non-white communities. The Federal Housing 
Authority included the HOLC tiered rating system in its 1939 Underwriting 
Manual, expressing concern about the impact of “incompatible racial or 
nationality groups” on property values and stating that, “if a neighborhood is 
to retain stability, it is necessary that properties shall continue to be occupied 
by the same social and racial classes.” GREGORY SQUIRES, CAPITAL AND 
COMMUNITIES IN BLACK AND WHITE 53 (1994). Private banks quickly came 
to rely on the HOLC and Federal Housing Authority rating system to make 
their own loan decisions, leading to the nearly complete denial of mortgage 
financing in African American neighborhoods through the process that came 
to be called “redlining.”  The Federal Housing Authority loans created by the 
National Housing Act of 1937 and the Veterans Administration loans created 
by the Servicemen‟s Readjustment Act of 1944 (the GI Bill) increased the 
purchasing power of the white middle class and spurred the growth of 
suburbs.  The loan programs guaranteed the value of collateral for loans made 
by private banks, enabling banks to make loans for up to ninety percent of the 
purchase price and to extend the repayment period for mortgages to thirty 
years.  The reduced risk for banks led to lower interest rates and dramatically 
increased homeownership rates among whites, but the same discriminatory 
lending standards applied and the program did little to benefit African 
Americans, who ended up trapped in inner cities as the white middle class left 
for new single-family suburban homes. See CHARLES ABRAMS, FORBIDDEN 
NEIGHBORS: A STUDY OF PREJUDICE IN HOUSING (1955); KENNETH T. 
JACKSON, CRABGRASS FRONTIER: THE SUBURBANIZATION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1985); PETER MEDOFF & HOLLY SKLAR, STREETS OF HOPE: THE 
FALL AND RISE OF AN URBAN NEIGHBORHOOD (1994); BERYL SATTER, 
FAMILY PROPERTIES: HOW THE STRUGGLE OVER RACE AND REAL ESTATE 
TRANSFORMED CHICAGO AND URBAN AMERICA (2009); Adam Gordon, The 
Creation of Homeownership: How New Deal Changes in Banking Regulation 
Simultaneously Made Homeownerhsip Accessible to Whites and Out of Reach for Blacks, 
115 YALE L.J. 186 (2005). 
15  ROBERT SELF, AMERICAN BABYLON: RACE AND THE STRUGGLE 
FOR POSTWAR OAKLAND 16 (2003).  
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class.16  Local governments perpetuated these divisions by adopting 
zoning ordinances that fostered race and class segregation, without 
explicitly mentioning race, by zoning whole communities only for 
large lot sizes with single-family homes or by restricting any multi-
family housing that might be permitted to largely minority urban 
renewal areas.17  From the 1950‟s to the 1970‟s, federal urban 
renewal policies were used to clear black neighborhoods seen as 
encroaching on white business districts and elite institutions.18 
Together, the spatial isolation of African American 
communities and the systematic disinvestment from black 
neighborhoods made it exceedingly difficult for African American 
                                                                                                       
16  See Richard T. Ford, The Boundaries of Race: Political Geography in Legal 
Analysis, 107 HARV. L. REV. 1843 (1994). 
17  See, e.g., Huntington Branch, NAACP v. Town of Huntington, 844 
F.2d 926 (2d Cir. 1988) (holding that the town‟s decision to zone multi-family 
housing only in narrow urban renewal area already with a predominate 
minority population would have a disproportionate impact on African 
Americans), aff'd, 488 U.S. 15 (1988); United States v. City of Black Jack, Mo., 
508 F.2d 1179 (8th Cir. 1974) (finding that the city‟s decision not to include 
zoning for multi-family housing violated the FHA because it would perpetuate 
segregation); Dews v. Town of Sunnyvale, 109 F. Supp. 2d 526, 570-73 (N.D. 
Tex. 2000) (finding intent to discriminate where town‟s zoning laws banned 
multi-family housing and required a minimum of one-acre lots for residential 
development, given the evidence that town had a history of excluding African 
Americans and departed from normal procedures in rejecting developer‟s 
rezoning application for multi-family housing); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of 
Educ., 624 F. Supp. 1276 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (finding discriminatory intent in the 
siting of public housing where the city rejected the planning board‟s site 
recommendations for subsidized housing in primarily white neighborhoods 
and rezoned available sites to make them unavailable), aff’d, 837 F.2d 1181 (2d 
Cir. 1987).  
18  Massey, supra note 4, at 73-74. Attempts to address the growing 
disinvestment from inner cities led to the Housing Acts of 1949 and 1954 and 
the national urban renewal programs. Urban renewal made federal funds 
available to municipalities to acquire land, clear it, and prepare it for 
redevelopment.  The program was frequently used to empty African American 
neighborhoods near central business districts and move displaced residents 
into concentrated public housing developments, further contributing to 
segregation. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN PROBLEMS, BUILDING 
THE AMERICAN CITY:  REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON URBAN 
PROBLEMS TO THE CONGRESS AND TO THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED 
STATES, H.R. DOC. NO. 91-34, at 12 (1968); ARNOLD R. HIRSCH, MAKING 
THE SECOND GHETTO:  RACE AND HOUSING IN CHICAGO 1940-1960 (1983); 
JUNE MANNING THOMAS, REDEVELOPMENT AND RACE:  PLANNING A FINER 
CITY IN POSTWAR DETROIT (1997); Marc A. Weiss, The Origins and Legacy of 
Urban Renewal, in URBAN AND REGIONAL PLANNING IN AN AGE OF 
AUSTERITY 53, 53-80 (Pierre Clavel et al. eds., 1980); Jon C. Teaford, Urban 
Renewal and Its Aftermath, 11 HOUS. POL‟Y DEBATE 443 (2000). 
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families to accumulate wealth.  This historical lack of access to 
mainstream financial services and to homeownership has been the 
central factor in creating the racial disparities in wealth that still 
structure United States‟ society.19 
 
B. Evidence of Contemporary Discrimination 
 
 The residential isolation experienced by non-white families, 
and the discrimination that fostered it, both persist today.20  The 
                                                                                                       
19  DOUGLAS S. MASSEY & NANCY A. DENTON, AMERICAN 
APARTHEID:  SEGREGATION AND THE MAKING OF THE UNDERCLASS (1993); 
MELVIN OLIVER & THOMAS SHAPIRO, BLACK WEALTH/WHITE WEALTH: A 
NEW PERSPECTIVE ON RACIAL INEQUALITY (1995).  The median household 
net worth for white households in 2007 was $170,000 compared with $17,000 
for African American households.  Brian K. Bucks et al., Changes in U.S. Family 
Finances from 2004 to 2007:  Evidence from the Survey of Consumer Finances, Fed. Res. 
Bull., Feb. 2009, at A4, A8.  See also Edward N. Wolff, Recent Trends in Household 
Wealth in the United States:  Rising Debt and the Middle-Class Squeeze 29 (Levy Econ. 
Inst., Working Paper No. 502, 2007), available at http://www.levy 
institute.org/pubs/wp_502.pdf (estimating the 2004 net worth of Latino 
households at $5,500).  Racial disparities in wealth are significantly larger than 
disparities in income, primarily because of the wide gaps in homeownership 
rates and home values between whites and nonwhites.  See Thomas M. 
Shapiro, Race, Homeownership and Wealth, 20 J.L. & POL‟Y 52 (2006); George 
Masnick, Home Ownership Trends and Racial Inequality in the United States in the 20th 
Century (Joint Ctr. for Hous. Stud., Working Paper No. 01-4, 2001), available at 
http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/masnick_w01-
4.pdf. In 2008, seventy-five percent of white households owned their own 
homes, whereas less than fifty percent of African American and Latino 
households did.  U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN HOUSING SURVEY (2008), 
available at http://www.census.gov/hhes/www/housing/hvs/annual08/ 
ann08ind.html. 
20  The most common measure of segregation is the index of 
dissimilarity.  It measures the evenness with which two groups are distributed 
across a set of smaller geographic areas that comprise the larger area being 
studied.  It is a measure generally from zero to one or zero to one hundred, 
where the higher the number, the more segregated the two groups are.  The 
index score can be interpreted as the percentage of one of the two groups 
included in the calculation that would have to move to different areas in order 
to produce a completely even distribution.  See Otis D. Duncan & Beverly 
Duncan, A Methodological Analysis of Segregation Indexes, 20 AM. SOC. REV. 210 
(1955).  For evaluations and critiques of the dissimilarity index, see Charles F. 
Cortese et al., Further Considerations on the Methodological Analysis of Segregation 
Indices, 41 AM. SOC. REV. 630 (1976); Douglas S. Massey & Nancy A. Denton, 
The Dimensions of Residential Segregation, 67 SOC. FORCES  281 (1988).  African 
Americans in major U.S. cities in 2000 generally experienced levels of 
segregation between sixty and eighty, and Latinos between forty and seventy, 
indicating high levels of segregation for both groups.  Nancy A. Denton, 
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2000 Housing Discrimination Study (HDS 2000), sponsored by 
HUD, found that African American, Latino, and Native American 
customers were denied at least some of the information and 
assistance comparable to that which white customers received in 
approximately one of five visits to a real estate or rental agent.21  
Furthermore, it remained common for African American and Latino 
renters to be told that a housing unit was unavailable when a white 
renter was offered the same unit.22 
Between 1989 and 2000, racial steering of African 
Americans seeking to buy homes increased,23 thereby perpetuating 
                                                                                                       
Segregation and Discrimination in Housing, in A RIGHT TO HOUSING: 
FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA 61 (Rachel G. Bratt et al. eds., 
2006). 
21  Margery Austin Turner & Stephen L. Ross, How Racial 
Discrimination Affects the Search for Housing, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
OPPORTUNITY:  RACE AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA 
81, 86 (Xavier de Souza Briggs ed., 2005); Margery Austin Turner et al., 
Housing Discrimination in Metropolitan America:  Unequal Treatment of African 
Americans, Hispanics, Asians, and Native Americans, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN 
CITIES: GOVERNMENT HOUSING AND FAIRNESS 40 (John Goering ed., 2007) 
[hereinafter Turner et al., Housing Discrimination in Metropolitan America]; 
MARGERY AUSTIN TURNER ET AL., THE URBAN INST., DISCRIMINATION IN 
METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS:  NATIONAL RESULTS FROM PHASE 1 
HDS 2000 (2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/portal/Publications/ 
pdf/Phase1_Report.pdf [hereinafter TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN 
METROPOLITAN HOUSING MARKETS].  Conducted by the Urban Institute, the 
HDS 2000 study sent out paired researchers—one white and one of color—
posing as otherwise identical home-seekers to visit real estate or rental agents 
to inquire about the availability of housing units in more than 5,400 paired 
tests in twenty-three metropolitan areas. 
22  TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING 
MARKETS, supra note 21, at iv (The overall incidence of white-favored 
treatment over African American renters declined from 26.4% in 1989 to 
21.6% in 2000.  The overall incidence of white-favored treatment over Latino 
renters was 26%, not significantly different from 1989 to 2000.).  Since 1989, 
there was also an increase in the percentage of Latino renters who were quoted 
a higher rent than their white counterparts for the same unit.  Id. at 3-7. 
23  TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING 
MARKETS, supra note 21, at 6-6 (The HDS 2000 study found that in 16.5% of 
paired tests, white homebuyers were shown more homes in neighborhoods 
with a higher percentage of white residents than African American 
homebuyers, a ten percentage point increase in the gross incidence of steering 
since the previous study in 1989.  Both the 2000 and 1989 studies were 
sponsored by HUD and conducted by the Urban Institute.  The HDS 2000 
study replicated the basic research design and testing protocols used in the 
1989 HDS study in order to yield comparable measures of differences in 
treatment.). 
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racial segregation by directing African American home-seekers away 
from predominantly white neighborhoods.24  Given that homes in 
white communities appreciate in value more quickly than homes of 
similar design, size, and appearance in black communities, the 
chances of accumulating wealth from investment in black 
communities are reduced.25  Some scholars have described the home 
value differentials as a “segregation tax” imposed on African 
American homeowners with the result that for every dollar African 
Americans spend on a house, they receive only eighty-two percent 
of the value that white homeowners receive.26 
African Americans and Latinos also experienced unequal 
access to the financial services associated with buying a home.27  
When individuals are denied advice and information about mortgage 
financing or steered into higher priced loans than they qualify for, 
their chances of obtaining favorable loan terms are compromised.  
Indeed, high-interest subprime loans are five times more likely to be 
made in predominantly African American neighborhoods than white 
ones.28 
                                                                                                       
24  Steering can include: (1) direct segregation steering, where non-
whites are encouraged to consider more non-white neighborhoods than 
whites; (2) information steering, where non-whites receive less information 
about a narrower range of neighborhoods in general than whites; and (3) class 
steering, in which non-whites are encouraged to consider less affluent 
neighborhoods than otherwise similarly situated whites.  Turner et al., Housing 
Discrimination in Metropolitan America, supra note 21, at 49-50. 
25  OLIVER & SHAPIRO, supra note 19, at 147; Chenoa Flippen, Unequal 
Returns to Housing Investments? A Study of Real Housing Appreciation Among Black, 
White, and Hispanic Households, 82 SOC. FORCES 1523 (2004). 
26  DAVID RUSK, THE BROOKINGS INST., THE “SEGREGATION TAX”: 
THE COST OF RACIAL SEGREGATION TO BLACK HOMEOWNERS (2001), 
available at http://www.brookings.edu/es/urban/publications/rusk.pdf 
(Examining the causes of the variation in home value between blacks and 
whites across one hundred metropolitan areas, Rusk controlled for numerous 
factors including the size of the metropolitan area, economic inequality across 
neighborhoods, and rates of home-ownership and found that the strongest 
predictor of the racial gap in home value were measures of racial segregation 
through both dissimilarity and isolation indices.). 
27  TURNER ET AL., DISCRIMINATION IN METROPOLITAN HOUSING 
MARKETS, supra note 21, at 8-1 to 8-6. 
28  U.S. DEP‟T OF HOUS. & URBAN DEV., UNEQUAL BURDEN: 
RACIAL DISPARITIES IN SUBPRIME LENDING IN AMERICA (2000), available at 
http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/unequal_full.pdf.  Subprime loans 
can be defined as home loans with an annual percentage rate at least three 
percentage points above the rate on U.S. Treasury securities of comparable 
maturity.  Robert G. Schwemm & Jeffrey L. Taren, Discretionary Pricing, Mortgage 
Discrimination, and the Fair Housing Act, 45 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 375 (2010). 
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Some argue that racial residential segregation is not primarily 
a byproduct of racial discrimination, but rather a result of 
nondiscriminatory class separation or different neighborhood 
preferences.  While wealth and preferences may each play a role, the 
results of the paired testing in the HDS 2000 study confirm that 
racial discrimination continues to pervade housing decisions.  
Analysis of the dissimilarity index of U.S. metropolitan areas by both 
race and class demonstrates that while economic status does play 
some role in explaining segregation, race continues to be a 
significant factor.29  Thus, both racial discrimination in housing and 
residential segregation continue.  
The ability to access housing in a particular location 
fundamentally shapes individuals‟ and households‟ ability to access 
opportunity.30  This Article focuses primarily on how segregation 
shapes households‟ access to financial services and, as a result, how 
segregation was a key catalyst in the foreclosure crisis.  In addition, 
segregation has significant, well-documented, independent effects on 
employment,31 health,32 and education.33 
                                                                                                       
29  For instance, the differences in segregation between high and low 
socio-economic status Latinos and Asian Americans are significantly larger 
than those among African Americans. John Iceland, Racial and Ethnic Residential 
Segregation and the Role of Socioeconomic Status 1980-2000, in FRAGILE RIGHTS 
WITHIN CITIES:  GOVERNMENT HOUSING AND FAIRNESS, supra note 21, at 
107, 114.  The pairing of race and class in the study was designed to control 
for class and isolate the effect of race.  The study found that race continues to 
play a significant role independent of socio-economic status in producing 
residential segregation, especially for African Americans.  Id. at 117. 
30  See Xavier de Souza Briggs, Re-shaping the Geography of Opportunity: 
Place Effects in Global Perspective, 18 HOUS. STUD. 915 (2003); George C. Galster, 
Trans-Atlantic Perspectives on Opportunity, Deprivation and the Housing Nexus, 17 
HOUS. STUD. 5 (2002); Gregory D. Squires & Charis E. Kubrin, Privileged Places: 
Race, Uneven Development and the Geography of Opportunity in Urban America, 42 
URB. STUD. 47 (2005); Rachel G. Kleit, Neighborhood Segregation, Personal 
Networks, and Access to Social Resources, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS 
FOR AMERICA, supra note 4, at 237.  
31 The relation between employment and residence has been 
extensively discussed in debates over skills and spatial mismatches and the 
shift of manufacturing to the suburbs, the sunbelt, and overseas, as well as the 
relative decline of industrial jobs and rise of the service sector in the U.S.  See 
WILLIAM J. WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED (1990); John Kasarda, 
Structural Factors Affecting the Location and Timing of Underclass Growth, 11 URB. 
GEOGRAPHY 234-64 (1990).  For critiques, see ROGER WALDINGER, STILL 
THE PROMISED CITY: AFRICAN AMERICANS AND NEW IMMIGRANTS IN 
POSTINDUSTRIAL NEW YORK (1999); Harry J. Holzer, The Spatial Mismatch 
Hypothesis:  What Has the Evidence Shown?, 28 URB. STUD. 105, 105-22 (1991).   
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See also Margery Austin Turner, Residential Segregation and Employment Inequality, in 
SEGREGATION:  THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA, supra note 4, at 151-66 
(While workplaces are less segregated than residences, African Americans and 
Latinos still work in different locations than whites.  The ratio of jobs to 
population is higher in primarily white suburbs than in multiracial 
neighborhoods or those with an African American or Latino majority.  
Further, jobs requiring low skill levels are more decentralized than high-skilled 
jobs, with roughly two-thirds of the low-skill openings located in primarily 
white suburbs.  The geography of employment intersects with the geography 
of residence to segregate low-skilled workers of color and place them at a 
disadvantage in discovering and accessing available jobs.).   
32  As owners and as renters, African Americans are more likely than 
whites to live in inadequate housing, with conditions such as lead paint, mold, 
rodents, insects, dampness and cold.  These conditions affect children‟s 
educational attendance and success, as well as adults‟ work attendance.  The 
location of housing and the attendant neighborhood conditions also affect 
residents‟ access to recreational facilities, healthy food, and supportive social 
institutions.  Dolores Acevedo-Garcia & Theresa L. Oyspuk, Impacts of Housing 
and Neighborhoods on Health: Pathways, Racial/Ethnic Disparities and Policy Directions, 
in SEGREGATION:  THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA, supra note 4, at 197; 
James Krieger & Donna Higgins, Housing and Health: Time Again for Public 
Health Action, 92 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 758, 760 (2002); David R. Williams & 
Chiquita Collins, Racial Residential Segregation: A Fundamental Cause of Racial 
Disparities in Health, 116 PUB. HEALTH REP. 404 (2001).  High debt and 
unmanageable payments that come with the predatory loans often targeted at 
African American and Latino borrowers may lead to detrimental physical and 
psychological health effects, especially for those who have difficulty making 
mortgage payments.  See William M. Rohe et al., The Social Benefits and Costs of 
Homeownership: A Critical Assessment of the Research 4-11 (Joint Ctr. for Hous. 
Stud., Low-Income Homeownership Working Paper No. 01-12, 2001), available 
at http://www.jchs.harvard.edu/publications/homeownership/liho01-12.pdf; 
Sarah Nettleton & Roger Burrows, Mortgage Debt, Insecure Homeownership and 
Health: An Exploratory Analysis, 20 SOC. HEALTH & ILLNESS 753 (2004). 
33  School segregation for African American and Latino students has 
been increasing steadily since the 1980‟s, partially because of continuing 
housing discrimination and persistent residential segregation.  GARY ORFIELD 
& CHUNGMEI LEE, HARVARD CIV. RTS. PROJECT, BROWN AT 50:  KING‟S 
DREAM OR PLESSY‟S NIGHTMARE? (2004) (on file with the Columbia Journal of 
Race and Law).  Under current school financing systems, the separation of 
households along race and class lines leads to unequal resources for schools, 
generally accompanied by a divergence in the quality of teachers and the 
preparation of students.  GARY ORFIELD & CHUNGMEI LEE, HARVARD CIV. 
RTS. PROJECT, WHY SEGREGATION MATTERS:  POVERTY AND EDUCATIONAL 
INEQUALITY (2005) (on file with the Columbia Journal of Race and Law).  
Housing and neighborhood quality each have significant independent impacts 
on student outcomes.  Deborah L. McKoy & Jeffrey M. Vincent, Housing and 
Education: The Inextricable Link, in SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR 
AMERICA, supra note 4, at 125, 130; Ingrid Gould Ellen & Margery Austin 
Turner, Does Neighborhood Matter? Assessing Recent Evidence, 8 HOUS. POL‟Y 
DEBATE 833 (1997). 
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III. SEGREGATION AND THE FINANCIAL COLLAPSE 
 
 Scholars have detailed the ways in which overbuilding, 
highly leveraged refinancings, widespread speculation, poor 
regulation of mortgage lenders, and the collapse of housing prices all 
played central roles in the rise in foreclosures across the country.34  
Scholars also have pointed to the ways in which sub-prime lenders 
targeted African American and Latino communities.35  However, 
few have identified the ways in which entrenched segregation and 
the unequal footing of different local governments contributed 
significantly to the economic conditions that enabled the collapse 
that began in 2007. 
Segregation was both the product of and a contributor to 
the development of a two-tiered financial services market.36  In 
communities of color, the history of redlining and the lack of 
experience with mainstream banks often limited consumers‟ abilities 
to shop for and find the best products in the marketplace.  At the 
same time, loan originators frequently received incentives that 
encouraged them to charge the highest combination of fees and 
interest that they could extract from a borrower.  This system led to 
unsolicited searches for the most inexperienced borrowers—who 
were the most easily overcharged—which led to discriminatory race-
based targeting.  These discriminatory loan terms led to high 
foreclosure rates and devastating consequences for households 
unable to keep up with their rising housing costs.  These practices 
also led to millions of dollars in public losses and significantly 
exacerbated persistent racial disparities in wealth. 
                                                                                                       
34  See, e.g., DAN IMMERGLUCK, FORECLOSED: HIGH-RISK LENDING, 
DEREGULATION, AND THE UNDERMINING OF AMERICA‟S MORTGAGE 
MARKET (2009); Edward L. Glaeser et al., Housing Supply and Housing Bubbles, 
45 URB. STUD. 693 (2008). 
35  Debbie Grunstein Bocian et al., Race, Ethnicity and Subprime Home 
Loan Pricing, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 1 (2008); Elvin K. Wyly et al., Subprime 
Mortgage Segmentation in the American Urban System, 99 TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR 
ECONOMISCHE EN SOCIALE GEOGRAFIE 1 (2007).  
36  See George C. Galster & W. Mark Keeney, Race, Residence, 
Discrimination and Economic Opportunity: Modeling the Nexus of Urban Racial 
Phenomena, 24 URB. AFF. Q. 87 (1988).  While racial residential segregation is 
partially the product of historic and continuing discrimination in financial 
services, it also interacted with financial deregulation to foster the expansion of 
a two-tiered financial services sector. 
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A. Financial Deregulation and the Commodification of 
Housing 
 
Over the past three decades, the financial industry 
succeeded in lobbying Congress for broad deregulation of mortgage 
lending, as well as for the creation of institutional and regulatory 
frameworks supporting the secondary mortgage market.  The 
deregulation intensified the commodification of urban environments 
in general and housing markets in particular.37  The 1980 Depository 
Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act preempted 
state usury laws and eliminated state limits on the points or fees 
banks could add to residential mortgage loans. 38  The elimination of 
these limits expanded access to home loans and created significant 
new opportunities for lenders to profit, but they also created 
significant new risks for borrowers.  Continuing the federal trend to 
eliminate state consumer financial protections, the 1982 Alternative 
Mortgage Transaction Parity Act preempted state laws restricting 
residential loans to conventional fixed-rate mortgages and thus 
opened the market to adjustable rate mortgages, interest-only loans, 
and balloon clauses. 39  Once these laws authorized new types of 
loans and eliminated usury caps, the 1984 Secondary Mortgage 
Market Enhancement Act40 augmented the ability of investment 
banks‟ to invest in new collateralized mortgage obligations, which 
created the opportunity for a secondary market in mortgages to 
develop.  Furthermore, the 1989 Financial Institutions Reform, 
Recovery and Enforcement Act41 increased capital requirements for 
savings banks, which encouraged them to sell the home loans that 
they had originated on the secondary market.  In addition, the 1992 
Federal Housing Enterprises Safety and Soundness Act42 amended 
the charters of the Federal National Mortgage Association (Fannie 
Mae) and the Federal Home Loan Mortgage Company (Freddie 
Mac) in order to reinforce the stability of these government-
sponsored entities designed to foster confidence in the secondary 
mortgage market and increase the liquidity of mortgage investments.  
Together, these legislative actions transformed inherently localized, 
                                                                                                       
37  See Kathe Newman, Post-Industrial Widgets: Capital Flows and the 
Production of the Urban, 33 INT‟L J. URB. & REG‟L RES. 314, 316-18 (2009). 
38  Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132 (1980). 
39  Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 1469 (1982). 
40  Pub. L. No. 98-440, 98 Stat. 1689 (1984). 
41  Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 498 (1989). 
42  Pub. L. No. 102-550, 106 Stat. 3941 (1992). 
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varied, and complex goods—homes—into standardized securities 
that national and international investors could purchase.43 
Federal deregulation encouraging investment in real estate 
together with institutional investors‟ desire to find products with 
steady returns increased capital flows into the secondary mortgage 
market and contributed to easier lending terms, which increased 
demand for housing and led to rising home prices.44  As a result, 
investors, lenders and homebuyers increasingly came to see housing 
less as a home and more as an investment vehicle that would only 
increase in value.  Real estate investing strategies moved from being 
the topic of late-night infomercials to popular prime-time cable TV 
shows such as “Flip This House” and “Property Ladder.” 
 
B. Two-Tiered Financial Services:  Redlining and Reverse 
Redlining 
 
Decades of redlining denied predominantly African 
American and Latino communities equal access to mainstream 
credit.45  After financial institutions created a relative vacuum in 
communities of color, which lacked access to and experience with 
mainstream capital, they realized that money could be made by 
targeting these same neighborhoods for separate and unequal 
financial products—a process that came to be known as reverse 
redlining.46 Lenders pioneered high-cost alternative mortgage 
structures at both the high- and low-income extremes, and brokers 
                                                                                                       
43  Kevin Gotham, The Secondary Circuit of Capital Reconsidered: 
Globalization and the U.S. Real Estate Sector, 112 AM. J. SOC. 231, 232 (2006). 
44  Newman, supra note 37, at 318. 
45  See supra note 14 and accompanying text.  
46  See, e.g., Hargraves v. Capital City Mortg. Corp., 140 F. Supp. 2d 7 
(D.D.C. 2000) (recognizing reverse redlining as the practice of extending credit 
on unfair terms to communities that had previously been redlined and finding 
that these predatory loan practices can make housing unavailable and thus 
constitute a violation of the FHA); Matthews v. New Century Mortg. Corp., 
185 F. Supp. 2d 874 (S.D. Ohio 2002) (finding that defendants‟ targeting of 
elderly, unmarried women homeowners for high-cost home equity loans 
constituted reverse redlining and was cognizable as violations of the FHA and 
ECOA); Barkley v. Olympia Mortg. Co., No. 04-cv-875, 2010 WL 3709278 
(E.D.N.Y. Sep. 13, 2010) (denying defendants‟ motion for summary judgment 
on reverse redlining and other claims and describing reverse redlining as a 
situation in which a lender unlawfully discriminates by extending credit to a 
neighborhood or class of people on terms less favorable than would been 
extended to those outside of the class). 
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and lenders then pushed these high-cost products and coercive sales 
tactics more widely.47 
Focusing on “borrowers with little knowledge of mortgage 
lending in general and their own financial options in particular,” 
lenders employed marketing techniques targeting communities of 
color that previously had been systematically denied credit and 
“deliberately sought out financially vulnerable borrowers for 
deceptive sales tactics and predatory mortgages.”48  Extensive 
evidence of lenders‟ targeting of communities of color and of 
lenders‟ discriminatory pricing is beginning to emerge in courts from 
suits alleging violations of state and federal fair lending, human 
rights, and deceptive practices laws that are currently being litigated 
by borrowers49 and by state attorneys general.50 
Recent research has confirmed that racial discrimination has 
been widespread at each step in the lending process, from 
                                                                                                       
47  Subprime loans grew from less than five percent of all home loan 
originations in 1994 to nearly a quarter of the mortgage market by 2006.  
Schwemm & Taren, supra note 28, at 378. 
48  Linda E. Fisher, Target Marketing of Subprime Loans: Racialized 
Consumer Fraud & Reverse Redlining, 18 J.L. & POL‟Y 121, 122, 124 (2009); 
Raymond H. Brescia, Subprime Communities: Reverse Redlining, the Fair Housing 
Act, and Emerging Issues in Litigation Regarding the Subprime Mortgage Crisis, 2 ALB. 
GOV‟T L. REV. 164, 172-73 (2009).  See Second Amended Complaint, Mayor 
and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, No. 08 Civ. 62 (D. Md. Apr. 7, 
2010); Complaint, City of Memphis v. Wells Fargo, No. 09 Civ. 2857 (W.D. 
Tenn. Dec. 30, 2009). 
49  One case thus far has been granted class certification, Ramirez v. 
Greenpoint Mortg. Funding, Inc., No. C08-0369, 2010 WL 2867068 (N.D. Cal. July 
20, 2010).  Several other cases have survived defendants‟ motions to dismiss.  
See e.g., Guerra v. GMAC LLC, No. 08-CV-01297, 2009 WL 449153 (E.D. Pa. 
Feb. 20, 2009); Steele v. GE MoneyBank, No. 08-CV-1880, 2009 WL 393860 
(N.D. Ill. Feb 17, 2009); Barrett v. H&R Block, Inc. 652 F. Supp. 2d 104 (D. 
Mass. 2009); Hoffman v. Option One Mortg. Corp. 589 F. Supp. 2d 1009 
(N.D. Ill. 2008); Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251 (D. 
Mass. 2008). 
50  See, e.g., State of Ohio v. Barclay‟s Capital Real Estate, No. 09 Civ. 
10136 (Montgomery Cnty. Ct. C.P. Sep. 16, 2010) (denying motion to dismiss 
complaint alleging violations of state unfair and deceptive practice laws); 
Commonwealth of Massachusetts v. Countrywide Fin. Corp., No. 10 Civ. 1169 
(Suffolk Cnty. Sup. Ct. Mar. 24, 2010) (approving settlement of case alleging 
unfair and discriminatory lending practices); Commonwealth of Massachusetts 
v. Fremont Inv. & Loan, 897 N.E.2d 548 (Mass. 2008) (affirming trial court‟s 
grant of preliminary injunction preventing defendant from foreclosing on 
certain “presumptively unfair” loans); Complaint, Illinois v. Wells Fargo, No. 
09 Ch. 2643 (Cook Cnty. Cir. Ct. July 31, 2009) (alleging violations of state 
human rights, fairness in lending, and deceptive business practices laws). 
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origination to mortgage servicing and foreclosure.51  When 
compared to white borrowers with similar credit histories, loan-to-
value ratios, personal characteristics, and residential locations, 
African Americans were significantly more likely to receive sub-
prime loans.52  Further, African American and Latino borrowers 
were significantly more likely than similarly situated white borrowers 
to receive loans with less favorable terms including higher cost 
ratios, prepayment penalties, and balloon payments.53  Analysis of 
national data on segregation, sub-prime lending, and foreclosures 
reveals that the variation in the rate of subprime loans received by 
African American and Latino borrowers as compared to white 
borrowers is strongly correlated with the level of segregation in the 
metropolitan region.54  In other words, national data indicates that 
the more segregated a metropolitan region is, the more likely African 
American and Latino borrowers were to receive high-cost, subprime 
loans. 
C. Discretionary Pricing and Discrimination 
 
The correlation between segregation and subprime lending 
exists partially because national lenders designed compensation 
systems that incentivized loan officers and brokers to use their 
discretion to charge higher interest rates and fees than borrowers 
actually qualified for, rewarding originators with yield spread 
                                                                                                       
51  See, e.g., IMMERGLUCK, supra note 34, at 78-98; GUY STUART, 
DISCRIMINATING RISK: THE U.S. MORTGAGE LENDING INDUSTRY IN THE 
TWENTIETH CENTURY (2003); Carolyn Bond & Richard Williams, Residential 
Segregation and the Transformation of Home Mortgage Lending, 86 SOC. FORCES 671 
(2007); Elvin K. Wyly et al., American Home: Predatory Mortgage Capital and 
Neighborhood Spaces of Race and Class Exploitation in the United States, 88 
GEOGRAFISKA ANNALER. 105 (2006). 
52  Robert B. Avery et al., The 2007 HMDA Data, 93 FED. RES. BULL. 
344 (2008).  Debbie Bocian et al., Unfair Lending:  The Effect of Race and Ethnicity 
on the Price of Subprime Mortgages, 60 J. ECON. & BUS. 114 (2006); Chris Mayer & 
Karen Pence, Subprime Mortgages: What, Where, and to Whom? 14 (Fed. Res. Bd. 
Fin & Econ. Discussion Series, Working Paper No. 2008-29, 2008), available at 
http://www.federalreserve.gov/pubs/feds/2008/200829/200829pap.pdf 
(“Even controlling for credit scores and other zip code characteristics, race 
and ethnicity appear to be strongly and statistically significantly related to the 
proportion of subprime loans.”). 
53  Michael LaCour-Little & Cynthia Holmes, Prepayment Penalties in 
Residential Mortgage Contracts: A Cost Benefit Analysis, 19 HOUS. POL‟Y DEBATE 
631 (2008); Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impact of Predatory Loan Terms on 
Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment Penalties and Balloon Payments, 
18 HOUS. POL‟Y DEBATE 311 (2007). 
54  Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the 
American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 642 (2010). 
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premiums and other forms of loan cost-based compensation.55  
Both lenders and brokers profited when borrowers paid inflated 
rates—lenders profited from higher interest rates than those 
justified by the economic risk (which also increased the values of the 
loan on the secondary market), while brokers collected larger 
compensation.56 Borrowers, however, suffered from significantly 
higher costs over the life of the loan which then lead to increased 
risks of default and foreclosure.57 This discretionary pricing 
structure created a system in which borrowers with prime credit, but 
lacking financial savvy, were steered into subprime loans,58 thereby 
predictably leading to widespread discrimination on the basis of 
race, age, and gender.59 The originators that made the loans, the 
                                                                                                       
55  Brokers were often paid through a combination of fees based on a 
percentage of the loan amount combined with yield spread premiums, which is 
a portion of the capitalized value of the difference between the minimum base 
rate at which the lender was willing to make the loan and the higher interest 
rate that the broker actually secured from the borrower.  Schwemm & Taren, 
supra note 28, at 395-97. 
56  Id. at 379. 
57  See IMMERGLUCK, supra note 34, at 133-58 (describing the 
economic and social costs of subprime lending). Lenders frequently made 
loans where it was unlikely that borrowers could repay.  Id. at 142-43.  Market 
participants frequently assumed house prices would always rise over time, and 
thus lenders presumed that the original borrower of an adjustable rate 
mortgage would refinance before their rates adjusted to a higher level that they 
would be unable to repay (or that if the bank had to foreclose, the home would 
exceed the value of the loan by then). Kristen David Adams, Homeownership: 
American Dream or Illusion of Empowerment?, 60 S.C. L. REV. 573, 606 (2009). In 
the short term, this was not damaging to lenders because they were securitizing 
the majority of loans and selling them to investors on the secondary market, 
thus making money from the loan without retaining the risk. U.S. GOV'T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, HOME MORTGAGE DEFAULTS AND 
FORECLOSURES: RECENT TRENDS AND ASSOCIATED ECONOMIC AND 
MARKET DEVELOPMENTS 22-23 (2007). In other cases, loans by predatory 
lenders targeted towards long-time homeowners with significant home equity 
actually were designed to lead to foreclosure so that the lender could seize the 
home and sell it to gain the equity.  See, e.g., United States v. Delta Funding 
Corp., No. 00 Civ. 1872 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000); Barkley v. Olympia Mortg. 
Co., No. 04-cv-875, 2010 WL 3709278 (E.D.N.Y. Sep. 13, 2010).  See also 
Schwemm & Taren, supra note 28, at 379.  
58  In addition to paying higher interest rates and fees for subprime 
and predatory loans, lenders also frequently added excessive points and fees 
that did not correspond to any benefits for the borrowers and included 
substantial prepayment penalties that trapped borrowers in the high-cost loans.  
Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and 
Economics of Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1259-70 (2002). 
59  The combination of discrimination on the basis of race, age, and 
gender is an example of the intersectionality of discrimination.  Kimberlé 
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commercial banks that packaged them into mortgage backed 
securities, and the investment banks that sold them let a desire for 
short-term profits triumph over ethics and the basics of long-term 
financial stability.60 
In one of the early cases challenging discretionary pricing 
policies, plaintiffs claimed that Countrywide Bank61 allowed its 
“retail salesmen, independent brokers, and correspondent lenders to 
add various charges and fees based on subjective non-risk factors, . . 
. which, in turn, has a racially discriminatory impact on African 
American borrowers”62  Plaintiffs allege that the discretionary 
pricing system made African American borrowers from 
Countrywide more than three times more likely to receive a 
subprime loan than similarly situated white borrowers.63  The court 
found that the facts alleged presented “a classic case of disparate 
impact:  White homeowners with identical or similar credit scores 
paid different rates and charges than African American 
                                                                                                       
Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against 
Women of Color, 43 STANFORD L. REV. 1241 (1991).  See also ALLEN J. FISHBEIN 
& PATRICK WOODALL, CONSUMER FED‟N OF AM., WOMEN ARE PRIME 
TARGETS FOR SUBPRIME LENDING: WOMEN ARE DISPROPORTIONATELY 
REPRESENTED IN HIGH-COST MORTGAGE MARKET, (2006), available at 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/WomenPrimeTargets 
Study120606.pdf; Donna S. Harkness, Predatory Lending Prevention Project:  
Prescribing a Cure for the Home Equity Loss Ailing the Elderly, 10 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 
1 (2000).  A case that epitomizes this intersecting discrimination is United States 
v. Delta Funding Corp., No. 00 Civ. 1872 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 30, 2000).  In Delta 
Funding, the Department of Justice, together with the Federal Trade 
Commission and the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban 
Development, brought suit against a lender who had engaged in a pattern and 
practice of targeting elderly African American widows with little or no 
mortgage debt and then persuading them to take out high-priced refinance 
loans that they could not afford in order to foreclose on and take their homes 
in order to strip their home equity. 
60  Sheila Bair, Chair, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Comments at the 
Urban Land Institute Conference (Oct. 13, 2010) (on file with the Columbia 
Journal of Race and Law). 
61  Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 255 (D. 
Mass. 2008).  The case named as defendants Countrywide Bank, N.A., along 
with its subsidiaries Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., Countrywide 
Correspondent Lending, Full Spectrum Lending, Inc., Summit Mortgage LLC; 
and Loans for Residential Homes Mortgage Corp.  Bank of America 
purchased Countrywide on July 1, 2008. 
62  Id. 
63  Id. at 253. 
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homeowners, because of a policy that allowed racial bias to play a 
part in the pricing scheme.”64 
In a context of extreme information asymmetries between 
borrowers and lenders, segregation facilitated the exploitation of 
those least able to protect themselves from lenders subject to 
minimal government regulation.65 The result was predictable 
discrimination in lending, which has had significant nationwide 
impacts on delinquencies and foreclosures, as well as on 
homeownership rates and disparities in household wealth. 
D. Disparate Impacts in Foreclosures 
 
As early as the late 1990‟s, high-cost subprime loans 
accounted for more than half of home loans in predominantly 
African American neighborhoods, compared with just nine percent 
in primarily white communities.66  Fannie Mae estimates that as 
many as half of subprime borrowers actually qualified for credit at 
lower prime rates—meaning that hundreds of millions of dollars 
annually were siphoned away from uninformed, working and 
middle-class families to mortgage brokers and to investors.67 
Seen together, these discriminatory lending practices result 
in African American and Latino borrowers who continue in these 
same loans paying substantially higher interest rates than comparable 
white borrowers, which means that in the aggregate, they are making 
billions of dollars in extra, discriminatory payments on their 
                                                                                                       
64  Id. at 254. 
65  See Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, From Credit Denial  
to Predatory Lending: The Challenge of Sustaining Minority Homeownership, in 
SEGREGATION: THE RISING COSTS FOR AMERICA, supra note 4, at 81; William 
C. Apgar & Allegra Calder, The Dual Mortgage Market: The Persistence of 
Discrimination in Mortgage Lending, in THE GEOGRAPHY OF OPPORTUNITY: RACE 
AND HOUSING CHOICE IN METROPOLITAN AMERICA, supra note 21, at 101-03; 
Newman, supra note 37. 
66  James Carr & Jenny Schuetz, Financial Services in Distressed 
Communities: Framing the Issue, Finding Solutions 11-12 (Fannie Mae Found., 
Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.knowledgeplex.org/kp/report/ 
report/relfiles/FinancialServices.pdf. 
67  James Carr & Lopa Kollluri, Predatory Lending: An Overview 37 
(Fannie Mae Found., Working Paper, 2001), available at http://www.knowledge 
plex.org/kp/report/report/relfiles/FinancialServices.pdf.  Analyses of national 
lending data have found that as subprime lending increased it included more 
and more borrowers with prime credit scores.  In 2006, more than sixty 
percent of subprime loans were made to borrowers with prime credit scores.  
Rick Brooks & Ruth Simon, Subprime Debacle Traps Even Very Credit-Worthy, 
WALL ST. J., Dec. 3, 2007, at A1. 
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mortgages.68  These extra payments simultaneously strip money 
away from communities of color and ultimately lead to higher 
foreclosure rates.69  Foreclosure often means the loss of significant 
equity that homeowners had built up in their home, usually their 
largest asset.  Both default and foreclosure also drastically lower 
borrowers‟ credit scores, often leading to significant collateral 
negative impacts on social and economic opportunities, as credit 
histories are used increasingly in evaluating applications for 
employment, rental housing, and access to other forms of capital.  
Foreclosures also have negative emotional and psychological 
consequences for those households forced to leave their homes, and 
often their neighborhoods and schools.70  Finally, foreclosures are 
often contributing to further segregation, especially in high value 
housing markets, where foreclosures are intertwined with 
gentrification. 
In addition to having a far-reaching negative impact on 
individuals and households, foreclosures create significant economic 
and social costs for neighborhoods, cities, and counties.71  Several 
cities and counties have filed suit alleging that lenders‟ deceptive and 
                                                                                                       
68  Schwemm & Taren, supra note 28, at 375-76. 
69  Professor John Powell has estimated the loss of equity to subprime 
borrowers of color facing foreclosure at nearly one quarter of a trillion dollars.  
John A. Powell, Reflections on the Past, Looking to the Future: The Fair Housing Act 
at 40, 41 IND. L. REV. 605, 624 (2008).  Subprime refinance loans with 
prepayment penalties have been found to be twenty percent more likely to lead 
to foreclosure than otherwise similar loans, while those with balloon payments 
were fifty percent more likely.  Roberto G. Quercia et al., The Impact of Predatory 
Loan Terms on Subprime Foreclosures: The Special Case of Prepayment Penalties and 
Balloon Payments, 18 HOUS. POL‟Y DEBATE 311 (2007). 
70  G. THOMAS KINGSLEY ET AL., THE URBAN INST., THE IMPACTS 
OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES (2009), available at 
http://www.urban.org/UploadedPDF/411909_impact_of_forclosures.pdf; 
VICKI BEEN ET AL., INST. FOR EDUC. & SOC. POL‟Y, FURMAN CTR., KIDS AND 
FORECLOSURES: NEW YORK CITY (2010), available at http://furmancenter.org 
/files/Foreclosures_and_Kids_Policy_Brief_Sept_2010.pdf. 
71  A study of Chicago estimated the direct costs to the city for each 
foreclosed, abandoned property requiring demolition at $30,000, including 
expenditures cities are forced to make for increased police and fire services, 
building inspections, sanitation activities, and demolition contracts.  WILLIAM 
APGAR & MARK DUDA, HOMEOWNERSHIP PRES. FOUND., COLLATERAL 
DAMAGE:  THE MUNICIPAL IMPACT OF TODAY‟S MORTGAGE FORECLOSURE 
BOOM (2005) (on file with the Columbia Journal of Race and Law).  In Chicago, 
foreclosures have been found to reduce the value of homes within one-eighth 
of a mile by one to one and one-half percent, adding up to an aggregate of 
$598 million in 1997 and 1998.  Dan Immergluck & Geoff Smith, The External 
Costs of Foreclosure: The Impact of Single-Family Mortgage Foreclosures on Property 
Values, 17 HOUS. POL‟Y DEBATE 57 (2006). 
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discriminatory loan terms led to unnecessarily high foreclosure rates 
and millions of dollars in public losses through reduced property tax 
revenues together with increased spending in response to vacant and 
abandoned buildings.72  These cases highlight the ways in which the 
segregation of neighborhoods facilitated further discrimination by 
enabling community-specific targeting,73 and the ways that these 
discriminatory lending practices have had significant disparate 
impacts on communities of color.74 
                                                                                                       
72  See Mayor and City Council of Baltimore v. Wells Fargo, No. 08 
Civ. 62 (D. Md. Sep. 14, 2010) (dismissing plaintiffs‟ suit under the FHA for 
lack of standing because of the lack of traceability of the alleged damages, but 
finding that “theoretically the City does have viable claims, if it can prove 
property specific injuries inflicted upon it at properties that would not have 
been vacant but for improper loans made by Wells Fargo” and granting the 
city leave to file a third amended complaint); Complaint, City of Memphis v. 
Wells Fargo, No. 09 Civ. 2857 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 2009).  See also 
Complaint, City of Buffalo and Byron W. Brown v. ABN AMRO Mortg. Grp., 
Inc., No. 08 Civ. 2200 (Erie Cnty. Sup. Ct. Feb. 20, 2008).  But see Cleveland v. 
Ameriquest, 615 F.3d 496 (6th Cir. 2010) (affirming dismissal of city‟s nuisance 
action against lenders on the grounds that the connection between the city‟s 
increased costs in dealing with vacant properties and the lenders‟ misconduct 
was too indirect to warrant discovery); City of Birmingham v. Argent, No. 09 
Civ. 467 (N.D. Ala. Aug. 19, 2009) (dismissing the case for lack of standing on 
the ground that the city‟s injuries were too tenuously connected to, and thus 
not fairly traceable to, the defendants‟ conduct). 
73  See Second Amended Complaint paras. 50-56, Wells Fargo, No. 08 
Civ. 62 (describing the techniques that Wells Fargo employees used to target 
African American neighborhoods, including a drop-down menu of languages 
in which loan officers could choose “African-American” as a language option 
for their marketing materials); id. paras. 57-62 (describing the significant 
financial and other incentives Wells Fargo created which encouraged loan 
officers to steer borrowers who qualified for low-cost prime loans into high-
cost subprime loans and the common practices through which loan officers 
deceived borrowers into accepting higher cost loans so that loan officers could 
increase their commissions); Complaint para. 60, City of Memphis v. Wells 
Fargo, No. 09 Civ. 2857 (W.D. Tenn. Dec. 30, 2009) (alleging that within 
Shelby County, Tennessee, a Wells Fargo loan in a predominantly African 
American neighborhood is eight times more likely to result in foreclosure than 
a loan in a predominantly white neighborhood). 
74  APGAR & DUDA, supra note 71; Dan Immergluck, Community 
Response to the Foreclosure Crisis: Thoughts on Local Interventions (Fed. Reserve Bank 
of Atlanta, Community Affairs Discussion Paper No. 01-08, 2008), available at 
http://www.frbatlanta.org/filelegacydocs/dp_0108.pdf.  Experts estimate that 
more than $500 billion in property value has been lost because of foreclosures 
on nearby homes. CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, SOARING 
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Regression analyses of national data have found that the 
higher the level of African American and Latino segregation in a 
metropolitan region, the higher the number and rate of foreclosures 
in that same region.75  In fact, Jacob Rugh and Douglas Massey‟s 
analysis indicated, “segregation‟s effect is independent of other 
economic causes of the crisis, and that segregation‟s explanatory 
power exceeds that of other factors hitherto identified as key 
causes.”76  With homes, and home equity lost and credit scores 
damaged, these individual acts of discrimination cumulate into 
significant intergenerational impacts that further exacerbate racial 
disparities in wealth and perpetuate unequal access to opportunity. 
 
IV. SEGREGATION AND FAIR HOUSING LAW 
 
Housing discrimination and unequal access to credit 
continue to contribute to residential segregation.  Residential 
segregation in turn exacerbates social inequality, with high social and 
economic costs for the country as a whole.  The primary tool to 
combat discrimination is the Fair Housing Act (FHA),77 passed in 
April of 1968 in the aftermath of Dr. Martin Luther King‟s 
assassination and amended in 1988.  As detailed below, however, 
efforts to enforce the FHA are crippled by a combination of lack of 
awareness by victims of discrimination, low levels of enforcement 
by the government agencies empowered to implement it, and weak 
penalties for law-breakers.  Even more fundamentally, however, the 
FHA can do little to dismantle segregation because the structures 
that encourage and perpetuate it are legally entrenched in our local 
government boundaries and home ownership structures. 
 
A.  Limits to Current Fair Housing Enforcement  
 
1. Low Reporting Levels 
 
Recognizing the discrepancy between the significant amount 
of discrimination experienced and the relatively low number of 
complaints filed, HUD sponsored two studies in 2002 and 2006, 
which were designed to examine the extent to which the public is 
                                                                                                       
75  Jacob S. Rugh & Douglas S. Massey, Racial Segregation and the 
American Foreclosure Crisis, 75 AM. SOC. REV. 629, 644 (2010). 
76  Id. 
77  42 U.S.C. §§ 3601-3631 (2006). 
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aware of fair housing laws and whether participants believed they 
had ever experienced unfair treatment in a housing transaction.78 
Most prospective renters or homebuyers who are denied 
housing or are offered unequal terms never know either the reason 
behind the denial or that someone else was offered the same house 
on more favorable terms.  Victims of discrimination often do not 
know fair housing laws, do not know they have been discriminated 
against, or both.  The current structure of fair housing enforcement, 
however, places the burden on victims to identify when they have 
encountered discrimination.79 
HUD‟s studies confirmed that some groups perceive less 
discrimination than that documented by national paired-testing 
studies.80  Further, between one-fifth and one-half of the public is 
not aware of one or more of the discriminatory acts that fair 
housing laws prohibit.81  Even among those who believed that they 
were discriminated against, four of every five took no action in 
response.82  The studies further revealed that only thirteen percent 
                                                                                                       
78  MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL & MARY K. CUNNINGHAM, THE URBAN 
INST., HOW MUCH DO WE KNOW? PUBLIC AWARENESS OF THE NATION‟S 
FAIR HOUSING LAWS (2002), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications 
/pdf/hmwk.pdf; MARTIN D. ABRAVANEL, THE URBAN INST., DO WE KNOW 
MORE NOW? TRENDS IN PUBLIC KNOWLEDGE, SUPPORT AND USE OF FAIR 
HOUSING LAW (2006), available at http://www.huduser.org/Publications/pdf/ 
FairHousingSurveyReport.pdf [hereinafter ABRAVANEL, DO WE KNOW MORE 
NOW?]. See also Martin Abravanel, Paradoxes in the Fair Housing Attitudes of the 
American Public, 2001-2005, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES: 
GOVERNMENT HOUSING AND FAIRNESS, supra note 21, at 81. 
79  See Michael Schill, Implementing the Federal Fair Housing Act: The 
Adjudication of Complaints, in FRAGILE RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES: GOVERNMENT 
HOUSING AND FAIRNESS, supra note 21, at 143, 151 (arguing that placing the 
burden of discrimination on the victim creates perverse incentives because 
“the more sophisticated the violator is, the less likely it is that the victim will 
successfully identify him or her”). 
80  ABRAVANEL, DO WE KNOW MORE NOW?, supra note 78, at 33-35 
(finding that only six percent of Latinos reported perceiving discrimination 
based on their race or ethnicity, four percent of households with children 
reported perceiving discrimination based on family status, and less than one 
percent of persons in households with a disabled individual reported 
perceiving discrimination based on disability, even though paired testing and 
other studies indicate discrimination against these groups is significantly more 
common than their perception suggests). 
81  Id. at 8-19. 
82  Id. at 36 (finding that those who were better informed about fair 
housing laws were more than twice as likely to take action in response to 
discrimination than those who were less well informed, but that even among 
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of the public thinks that it is “very likely” that “good results” would 
be accomplished from filing a fair housing complaint with HUD.83  
This belief is, perhaps, one reason for the low number of complaints 
filed. 
 
2. Ad Hoc Enforcement and Weak Penalties 
 
A study conducted by Michael Schill has revealed that this 
widespread skepticism about the efficacy of filing fair housing 
complaints may be well-founded.84  Building on research about the 
extent of discrimination and the lack of public confidence in the fair 
housing enforcement system, Schill analyzed data on the 
adjudication of fair housing complaints under existing law.85  He 
found that only three percent of all claims filed led to HUD bringing 
charges against the respondent, and the number of claims pursued 
has been declining in recent years.86  In those cases that settled, the 
average settlement was less than $2,000.87  Claims that were 
adjudicated by HUD administrative law judges or in federal court 
had average awards of less than $10,000.88 
Based on this data, Schill argued that in the current 
complaint-based system of regulation, fair housing enforcement is 
unsystematic and penalties are too low to have the broad impact 
required to reduce discrimination significantly.89  Laws such as the 
FHA can have a substantial deterrent effect only under two sets of 
conditions:  (1) if penalties are low, then enforcement must be 
intensive so that the majority of lawbreakers will face consequences; 
or (2) if identification and prosecution of the majority of 
                                                                                                       
the well-informed three out of four people still took no action in response to 
discrimination). 
83  Id. at 43. 
84  Schill, supra note 79, at 151-56. 
85  Id. at 143, 151-56.  Over the past two decades, an average of 
approximately 7,750 fair housing complaints have been filed annually with 
HUD or with state or local Fair Housing Assistance Program agencies.  Of the 
claims filed between 1989 and 2003, just over one-third were settled, just 
under one-third were withdrawn for reasons unrelated to the merits of the 
case, and about one-quarter were dismissed by HUD on the basis of a 
determination that no cause existed to believe that discrimination had 
occurred.  Of the complainants that Schill surveyed, 82.9 percent reported that 
it had taken HUD over one year to decide whether or not to issue a charge 
against the respondent.  Id. at 160. 
86  Id. at 154. 
87  Id. at 158 fig.7.4. 
88  Id. at 174 n.23. 
89  Id. at 169. 
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lawbreakers is not feasible, then deterrence requires high penalties 
for the few who are caught.90  According to Schill, “[c]urrent 
enforcement of the Fair Housing Act shares neither of these 
characteristics—very few . . . cases are actually brought (when 
measured against baseline estimates of the amount of discrimination 
in the housing market) and the average penalty is exceedingly low.”91 
 
B. Limits to Fair Housing Remedies:  Obstacles to Regional 
Responsibility 
 
Nevertheless, efforts to create truly open access to housing 
options through civil rights enforcement recently have had 
significant successes, especially in giving renewed importance to the 
FHA‟s requirement that HUD, and any government entities that 
receive HUD funding, “affirmatively further” fair housing.92  In 
Thompson v. U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development, the 
federal district court found HUD liable for having violated its 
statutory duty to affirmatively further fair housing because it failed 
to consider adequately regional approaches to reducing racial 
segregation in public housing in Baltimore County.93  The decision is 
                                                                                                       
90  Id. 
91  Id.  Schill concludes that “[a] move away from individual complaint 
processing, investigation, and prosecution and toward a greater emphasis on 
pattern and practice investigations would be most successful if it could engage 
the energy and expertise of the large number of private Fair Housing 
enforcement groups throughout the nation.”  Id. at 170.  See also Mara Sidney, 
National Fair Housing Policy and Its (Perverse) Effects on Local Advocacy, in FRAGILE 
RIGHTS WITHIN CITIES: GOVERNMENT HOUSING AND FAIRNESS, supra note 
21, at 203 (analyzing the federal Fair Housing Initiatives Program (FHIP) that 
was created by the 1987 Housing and Community Development Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 3616 (2006); Pub. L. No. 100-242, § 561, 101 Stat. 1815 (1988), to 
fund private nonprofit fair housing organizations on an annual competitive 
basis to undertake enforcement and education activities and finding that the 
lack of support in private philanthropy for fair housing work, the limited 
government funding, the annual competitive applications, and shifting federal 
priorities for grantees mean that “[p]olicies intended to fight injustice in effect 
help to sustain it by weakening logical local alliances . . . . Locally based fair 
housing advocacy, central to the promotion and execution of civil rights, has 
become unstable, lacks creative approaches to problems, and relies too heavily 
on federal as opposed to local resources and support.”). 
92  42 U.S.C. § 3608(e)(5) (2006) (“The Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development shall . . . administer the programs and activities relating to 
housing and urban development in a manner affirmatively to further the 
policies of this subchapter.”). 
93  Thompson v. U.S. Dep‟t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 348 F. Supp. 2d 
398 (D. Md. 2005).  See Florence Wagman Roisman, Affirmatively Furthering Fair 
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significant both in finding liability under the duty to “affirmatively 
further” fair housing and in calling for a regional solution. 
Promising results also emerged recently in the settlement 
among the parties in Anti-discrimination Center of Metro New York v. 
Westchester County, in which the district court confirmed that the duty 
to affirmatively further fair housing extended to county 
governments receiving HUD funding.94  In that case, the Anti-
discrimination Center of Metro New York (Anti-discrimination 
Center) brought suit under the False Claims Act,95 alleging that the 
county had failed to analyze appropriately the obstacles to fair 
housing in terms of race, as required for receipt of millions of 
dollars in HUD grants.  The court found that Westchester County 
had “utterly failed” to meet its obligations to affirmatively further 
fair housing and that Westchester‟s certifications to HUD were 
“false or fraudulent.”96  The county ultimately settled the case, 
agreeing to create 750 units of affordable housing.  The majority of 
these units must be built in municipalities with an African American 
population of less than three percent and a Latino population of less 
than seven percent.97 
Both of these cases succeeded in winning innovative 
regional remedies for lack of housing choice by holding accountable 
entities that have a regional reach—in the first case an agency of the 
federal government, and in the second case a large suburban county.  
The outcome of these cases, however, also highlights the way in 
which the reification of fragmented structures of local governance 
has been used to effectively immunize local governments from 
liability for actions that have discriminatory impacts.   
The court in Thompson stated that “[t]hrough regionalization, 
HUD had the practical power and leverage to accomplish 
desegregation through a course of action that Local Defendants 
could not implement on their own, given their own jurisdictional 
limitations.”98 This absolution of local governments reveals a 
                                                                                                       
Housing in Regional Housing Markets: The Baltimore Public Housing Desegregation 
Litigation, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 333 (2007). 
94  United States ex rel. Anti-discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. 
Westchester County, N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 2860, 2009 WL 455269 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 
24, 2009). 
95  31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006). 
96  United States ex rel. Anti-discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc., 2009 
WL 455269, at *14, *22. 
97  Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal, United States 
ex rel. Anti-discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester County, 
N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 2860 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009). 
98  Thompson, 348 F. Supp. 2d at 462. 
  
91 INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO FORECLOSURES Vol. 1:1 
 
 
significant limitation in the effectiveness of fair housing 
enforcement.  If courts are unable to look at the impact of individual 
municipalities‟ decisions together on the region as a whole, it 
becomes very difficult to hold local governments legally accountable 
for the entrenched segregation created by their zoning practices and 
boundaries. 
Similarly, while the Anti-discrimination Center reached a 
favorable settlement with the county in its case, the ability to reach a 
countywide settlement relied on the fact that Westchester County 
received grants from HUD that it distributed to its towns and 
villages.99  Those municipalities that receive no HUD funding are 
largely immune from similar suits, and suits against those 
municipalities that receive funding directly from HUD, if successful, 
would be unlikely to lead to regional or inter-municipal remedies. 
Among other defenses, Westchester County claimed that its 
failure to address impediments to fair housing based on race was 
part of “a policy of cooperation with municipalities [within the 
County], in light of what [the County] terms „political reality‟ and 
due to its belief that cooperation is the most productive avenue for 
increasing the stock of affordable housing.”100  In other words, the 
County implied that it was pursuing a strategy of acquiescing to the 
racially discriminatory actions of the county‟s local governments and 
excluding African American and Latino residents from subsidized 
housing to gain needed municipal support for the construction of 
affordable housing for white seniors and other residents whom the 
towns found acceptable.  For example, two municipalities in 
Westchester had passed official resolutions refusing to cooperate 
with the County‟s affordable housing goals and the majority 
explicitly looked only to the housing needs of their existing 
residents, not to the needs of the County or region as a whole.101  
Despite the fact that one of the driving forces perpetuating 
segregation within the County was pressure from local governments, 
the case broke no new ground in holding municipalities responsible 
for their exclusionary practices in relation to the region.102 
                                                                                                       
99  United States ex rel. Anti-discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc., 2009 
WL 455269, at *2. 
100  Id. 
101  Complaint paras. 44-67, United States ex rel. Anti-discrimination 
Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester County, N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 2860 
(S.D.N.Y. Apr. 6, 2006). 
102  Stipulation and Order of Settlement and Dismissal, United States 
ex rel. Anti-discrimination Ctr. of Metro N.Y., Inc. v. Westchester County, 
N.Y., No. 06 Civ. 2860 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 10, 2009).  The settlement, however, 
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While advocates and civil rights lawyers should maintain the 
pressure that cases like these can create for creative regional 
solutions, these cases illuminate the need to address the institutional 
framework of local governance as the principal institution 
organizing the repetitive and structured interactions that limit 
housing choice.  Addressing both discrimination and segregation 
will require adding to the compliance frame of accountability and 
ensuring that the frame draws on institutional analysis to engage a 
wider range of norms, actors, and social mechanisms in creating 
systemic change.103  As legal scholars have argued in the 
employment context, widespread unconscious or implicit bias 
interacts with institutional structures to “generate[] inequalities that 
our current antidiscrimination law is not well equipped to solve,” 
because of its focus on proscribing primarily the discrete, deviant, 
and intentionally discriminatory acts of individuals.104  Creating truly 
equal housing opportunity requires going beyond punishing 
intentional, individual acts to change the institutional structures of 
local governance that incentivize race and class segregation.  It also 
requires creating more variety in the forms of housing tenure in 
order to create security for households across the wealth spectrum, 
as well as stability for neighborhoods with a mix of incomes. 
 
V. SEGREGATION AND THE STRUCTURE OF LOCAL 
GOVERNANCE 
 
Residential segregation continues to be produced through 
the social and legal architecture of strong private property rights, 
inter-municipal competition, and fragmented local government 
financing.  While facially discriminatory laws mandating segregated 
neighborhoods have been overturned, local governance and 
financing structures, as well as the economic assumptions that 
                                                                                                       
did require the County to repeal its law giving municipalities a “right to first 
refusal” on County land purchases for the construction of affordable housing.  
Id. para. 25(c).  It also stated that the County shall “use all available means” to 
address a municipality‟s failure to promote the objectives of the stipulation.  Id. 
para. 7(i).   
103  ELINOR OSTROM, UNDERSTANDING INSTITUTIONAL DIVERSITY 
(2005) (exploring how institutions influence behavior as well as providing tools 
for choosing the relevant levels of interaction at which to make institutional 
change). 
104  Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of 
Antidiscrimination Law, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 3 (2006); Susan Sturm, Second 
Generation Employment Discrimination: A Structural Approach, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 
458 (2001). 
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encourage both racial and economic exclusion in suburban 
neighborhoods, remain. 
Even systematic investigations of builders, brokers, lenders, 
or landlords who discriminate will not challenge the significant 
incentives that remain for real estate actors in wealthier, whiter 
neighborhoods to exclude non-white residents through legal policies 
such as exclusionary zoning or the refusal to provide public services 
needed by those who cannot afford them privately.105  Thus, one 
must look beyond fair housing laws and their enforcement to the 
political and economic structures that perpetuate residential 
segregation in order to understand and address the persistence of 
racial discrimination in housing. 
 
A. Economic Localism and Local Governance 
 
Charles Tiebout and public choice theorists building on his 
work provide the most influential articulation of the economic 
assumptions supporting predominant local governance structures.106  
Tiebout celebrates the highly fragmented structure of local 
governments and supports the idea that local governments and 
public services should be funded primarily through local property 
taxes.107  In Tiebout‟s abstract model, residents are consumers who 
pick a community that best satisfies their preferences for taxes 
levied and public goods provided.108  Consumers‟ power in this 
model comes primarily from their ability to vote with their feet and 
                                                                                                       
105  See, e.g., Cox v. City of Dallas, 430 F.3d 734, 739-40 (5th Cir. 
2005) (dismissing the FHA claims of black homeowners alleging that the city 
knowingly tolerated an illegal landfill in their neighborhood which diminished 
the habitability of their homes and their ability to sell them “because the 
service was not „connected‟ to the sale or rental of a dwelling”); Steele v. City 
of Port Wentworth, Ga., 2008 WL 717813, slip op. at *12-13 (S.D. Ga. 2008) 
(dismissing the FHA claims of African American residents denied water and 
sewer services because the court found that the denial of services did not 
affect the availability of housing); but cf. United Farmworkers of Fla. Hous. 
Project v. City of Delray Beach, 493 F.2d 799 (5th Cir. 1974) (finding that 
municipality‟s refusal to allow a proposed development to tie into water and 
sewer system constitutes evidence of prima facie case of racial discrimination); 
Campbell v. City of Berwyn, 815 F. Supp. 1138, 1143 (N.D. Ill. 1993) (finding 
that the city‟s withdrawal of police protection violates § 3604(b) of the FHA).  
See also Robert G. Schwemm, Cox, Halprin, and Discriminatory Municipal Services 
Under the Fair Housing Act, 41 IND. L. REV. 717 (2008). 
106  Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. 
ECON. 416, 416-18 (1956); THE TIEBOUT MODEL AT FIFTY (William A. 
Fischel ed., 2006).  
107  Tiebout, supra 106, at 416. 
108  Id. at 418, 422. 
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leave municipalities that do not meet their preferences.  Others have 
drawn from Tiebout‟s model to examine ways in which local 
governments compete with each other to attract high-income, low-
service-demanding taxpayers by cutting both public services in 
general and redistributive programs in particular.109 
Macro-economic changes over the past three decades have 
reinforced the salience of Tiebout‟s theory as well as political 
support for rational choice approaches to policy-making.110  The 
past three decades in United States policy have witnessed a number 
of government initiatives to deregulate financial and other 
industries, as well as efforts to privatize public goods and encourage 
greater use of market incentives in government.111  The shift from 
the manufacturing of commodities to the manufacturing of financial 
products and the increased centrality of finance and banking to the 
economy relied on both deregulation and government support for 
the commodification of housing and the expansion of mortgage 
                                                                                                       
109  See PAUL PETERSON, CITY LIMITS (1981); MARK SCHNEIDER, 
THE COMPETITIVE CITY: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF SUBURBIA (1989).  
This same logic of cities in competition to reduce taxes and public 
expenditures and to attract wealthy corporate and individual residents also has 
been applied to cities on a global scale.  SASKIA SASSEN, THE GLOBAL CITY: 
NEW YORK, LONDON, TOKYO (1991). 
110  Political and economic theorists have identified a general shift in 
dominance from the Keynesian economic policies and “embedded liberal” 
capital-labor relations that dominated the first decades of the post-war era 
towards more laissez-faire and supply-side economic policies, beginning with 
the stagflation crisis and deindustrialization in the 1970‟s in the United 
Kingdom and the United States. See generally DAVID HARVEY, A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF NEOLIBERALISM (2005); MONICA PRASAD, THE POLITICS OF 
FREE MARKETS: THE RISE OF NEOLIBERAL ECONOMIC POLICIES IN BRITAIN, 
FRANCE, GERMANY & THE UNITED STATES (2006); JOSEPH STIGLITZ, 
GLOBALIZATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS (2003).  The experience of 
deindustrialization in U.S. cities in the 1960‟s and 1970‟s was part of the 
decentralization of economic activity internationally, and was paralleled by the 
concentration of control and services complexes and a rise in the prominence 
of the finance, insurance and real estate sectors.  The increase in high-level, 
specialized jobs was accompanied by a larger expansion of low-wage, unskilled 
positions in both consumer services and in downgraded manufacturing 
sectors.  This reorganization of capital-labor relations was characterized by 
polarization in the income distribution of the labor force.  SASKIA SASSEN, 
THE MOBILITY OF LABOR AND CAPITAL: A STUDY IN INTERNATIONAL 
INVESTMENT AND LABOR FLOW 136 (1988). 
111  See generally HARVEY, supra note 110; DAVID HARVEY, THE 
URBAN EXPERIENCE (1989). 
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lending.112  These policies have devolved increasing responsibilities 
to state and local governments, while reducing the federal funding 
they receive to carry out these mandates, thereby strengthening the 
economic localism Tiebout theorized. This devolution has 
encouraged “entrepreneurial” governance structures and has forced 
local governments to rely increasingly on “own source revenues,”113 
creating incentives to engage in a race to the bottom to attract or 
retain commercial taxpayers by offering corporate tax-breaks and 
reducing property taxes, while reducing the provision of public 
goods and services.114  This shift to increasing local responsibilities 
and simultaneously decreasing local aid adds to the already powerful 
incentives for race and class based segregation by encouraging 
localities to implement policies that will augment their tax base by 
seeking to attract wealthier homeowners while excluding vulnerable 
households.  These pro-development policies also contributed to the 
“exuberance” that led to the creation of the housing bubble, as 
individuals, investors and local governments all depended 
increasingly on the promise of rising property values.115 
                                                                                                       
112  Greta Krippner, The Financialization of the American Economy, 3 
SOCIO-ECON. REV. 173 (2005); Gotham, supra note 43, at 231-75; Newman, 
supra note 37.  
113  See, e.g., David Harvey, From Managerialism to Entrepreneurialism: The 
Transformation in Urban Governance in Late Capitalism, 71 GEOGRAFISKA 
ANNALER. SERIES B, HUMAN GEOGRAPHY 3 (1989); Rachel Weber, Extracting 
Value From the City: Neoliberalism and Urban Development, in SPACES OF 
NEOLIBERALISM 172 (Neil Brenner & Nikolas Theodore eds., 2002) (arguing 
that in competing to attract investors, urban governments‟ land use activities 
have sometimes been reduced to preparing urban property for the extraction 
of value by developers in the hopes that current redevelopment will lead to 
future increases in tax revenues). 
114  JOHN MOLLENKOPF, THE CONTESTED CITY (1983); JOHN R. 
LOGAN & HARVEY L. MOLOTCH, URBAN FORTUNES: THE POLITICAL 
ECONOMY OF PLACE (1987); STATE RESTRUCTURING AND LOCAL POWER: A 
COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (Chris Pickvance & Edmond Preteceille eds., 
1991).  At the same time, there are many exceptions to this general trend: 
Cities and states have increasingly tried to demand more accountability from 
corporations in exchange for the benefits they receive and efforts at regional 
governance have had significant successes.  See, e.g., Jennifer Gilbert, Selling the 
City Without Selling Out: New Legislation on Development Incentives Emphasizes 
Accountability, 27 URB. LAW. 427 (1995); see also the work of organizations such 
as Good Jobs First (www.goodjobsfirst.org) and Jobs with Justice 
(www.jwj.org ).  Nevertheless, the Tiebout model and the policy orientation of 
cities in competition that it supports remains dominant. 
115  ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE 1 (2000) (quoting 
Alan Greenspan, Chairman, Fed. Reserve, The Challenge of Central Banking in a 
Democratic Society, Address before The American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research, Washington, D.C. (Dec. 5, 1996), http://www.federalreserve.  
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B. Grounds for Rejecting Localism 
 
1. Equitable Grounds 
 
While theories of cities116 in competition may describe some 
of the problems facing municipalities, that descriptive power does 
not translate into a normative justification for the current structure 
of local governments.117  Tiebout argues that municipalities should 
be understood to be products like any other and describes municipal 
differences as the result of efforts to cater to idiosyncratic 
“preferences.”118  The reality, however, is that governments are not 
commodities, citizens are not consumers, and there is no true 
market for legislative bodies or administrative agencies.  Inter-local 
conflicts over land use regulation119 and school finance reform120 are 
                                                                                                       
gov/boarddocs/speeches/19961205.htm) (asking “ . . . how do we know when 
irrational exuberance has unduly escalated asset values, which then become 
subject to unexpected and prolonged contractions . . . ?”)). 
116  Cities and regions are not actors in themselves, and the references 
to cities and regions in this Article serve as shorthand for local governments 
and political and economic leaders that do act.  See Peter Marcuse, ‘The City’ as 
Perverse Metaphor, 9 CITY 247, 252 (2005). 
117  As Richard Briffault points out, Tiebout‟s focus on the central 
role of the mobile “consumer-voter” that chooses residence based on the 
combination of taxes levied and services provided encourages local 
governments to respond by competing with each other and catering to the 
needs of those who threaten to leave for another municipality with lower 
taxes: “[T]he individuals who drive the system and make it work are the ones 
who leave . . . [and] it is unclear why we should want a local government 
system in which the critical actors are those with the weakest ties to the 
locality.”  Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II—Localism and Legal Theory, 90 
COLUM. L. REV. 346, 415-16 (1990) [hereinafter Briffault, Our Localism]. 
118  Tiebout suggests that this public choice theory of local 
expenditures “reveals the consumer-voter‟s demand for public goods” and that 
“[s]patial mobility provides the local public-goods counterpart to the private 
market‟s shopping trip.”  Tiebout, supra note 106, at 420, 422. 
119  See, e.g., Austin Indep. Sch. Dist. v. City of Sunset Valley, 502 
S.W.2d 670 (Tex. 1973) (addressing conflicts between a local school district 
and a city over the city‟s efforts to prohibit the location of school facilities 
within its boundaries); Vill. of Barrington Hills v. Vill of Hoffman Estates, 410 
N.E.2d 37 (Ill. 1980) (granting standing to a village to sue the neighboring 
village challenging its rezoning along the municipal boundary).  See also Shelley 
Ross Saxer, Local Autonomy or Regionalism? Sharing the Benefits and Burdens of 
Suburban Commercial Development, 30 IND. L. REV. 659 (1997). 
120  See, e.g., DuPree v. Alma Sch. Dist. No. 30, 651 S.W.2d 90, 93 
(Ark. 1983) (finding that the statutory method of financing public schools in 
Arkansas “bears no rational relationship to the educational needs of the 
individual districts, rather it is determined primarily by the tax base of each 
district”); Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 777 S.W.2d 391, 397 (Tex. 
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two of the most visible externalities and market failures inherent in 
current structures of local governance that help explain why we turn 
to representative democracy at multiple scales to help structure our 
social relations at the municipal level.121  The variation between 
different municipalities‟ taxing and spending decisions—while 
shaped by citizens‟ preferences—are determined largely by 
differences in local fiscal capacity that place municipalities within 
each metropolitan area on highly unequal footing.  Indeed, the 
financial capacity of local governments depends often on the 
locational decisions of industrial, commercial, and financial firms 
and on broad regional, national or international economic 
developments that are beyond their control. 
Structuring local governments around theories of economic 
localism and inter-municipal competition benefits those areas that 
are already wealthy at the expense of those regions that are socio-
economically diverse, working class, or poor.  The United States has 
one of the most fragmented structures of local government in the 
world with more than 90,000 local governments and an average of 
over one hundred local governments per metropolitan area.122  This 
proliferation of local governments is far from random; it almost 
goes without saying that local government boundaries frequently 
serve as boundaries between different socio-economic groups.  This 
fragmentation then is often used to reinforce segregation by both 
income and race and it further exacerbates inequality in access to 
resources, as it forces cities and towns into competition with each 
other to maximize investment and minimize social expenditures.123  
As Richard Briffault points out, “economic localism reflects and 
reinforces existing interpersonal and inter-local inequalities . . . . [I]f 
the amelioration of inequality is to remain an important value in our 
                                                                                                       
1989) (holding that “the state‟s school financing system is neither financially 
efficient nor efficient in the sense of providing for a „general diffusion of 
knowledge‟ ” and thus violates the Texas Constitution, especially given that 
“[p]roperty-poor districts are trapped in a cycle of poverty from which there is 
no opportunity to free themselves”).  See also Richard Briffault, The Role of Local 
Control in School Finance Reform, 24 CONN. L. REV. 773 (1992); Dorothy Brown, 
Deconstructing Local Control: Ohio’s Contribution, 25 CAP. U. L. REV. 1 (1996).  
121  PETER DREIER ET AL., PLACE MATTERS: METROPOLITICS FOR 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2001); Richard Briffault, The Local Government 
Boundary Problem in Metropolitan Areas, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1115 (1996); Todd 
Swanstrom, What We Argue About When We Argue About Regionalism, 23 J. URB. 
AFF. 479, 481 (2001). 
122  RICHARD BRIFFAULT & LAURIE REYNOLDS, STATE AND LOCAL 
GOVERNMENT LAW 8 (7th ed. 2009); Swanstrom, supra note 121, at 483.  
123  Kenneth Newton, American Urban Politics: Social Class, Political 
Structure and Public Goods, 11 URB. AFF. Q. 241, 244-45 (1975). 
 
2011  COLUMBIA JOURNAL OF RACE AND LAW 98 
  
 
legal and political culture, then economic localism cannot provide a 
sufficient normative basis for protecting, let alone extending, local 
autonomy.”124 
While market forces may foster geographical clustering by 
income, what is most problematic is the manipulation of municipal 
boundaries to isolate those clusters from responsibility for their 
advantage and their neighbors‟ relative disadvantage that is most 
problematic.  Indeed, wealthy communities often use economic 
gerrymandering to set themselves jurisdictionally and financially 
apart. 
 
2. Economic Grounds 
 
In addition to the strong arguments for rethinking the 
fragmentation of metropolitan areas based on equality and fairness 
grounds, there are also arguments based on the economic self-
interest of both suburbs and cities.  As economic competition is 
                                                                                                       
124  Briffault, Our Localism, supra note 117, at 425.  This conception of 
localities in perpetual competition, forced to engage in a perpetual race to the 
bottom, however, has been questioned at both the local and the global level.  
See JAMES DEFILIPPIS, UNMAKING GOLIATH: COMMUNITY CONTROL IN THE 
FACE OF GLOBAL CAPITAL (2004) (discussing actions local communities can 
perform to control their environments in a global economy); JENNIFER 
ROBINSON, ORDINARY CITIES: BETWEEN MODERNITY AND DEVELOPMENT 
(2006); MICHAEL PETER SMITH, TRANSNATIONAL URBANISM: LOCATING 
GLOBALIZATION (2001). Smith provocatively claims that the discourse of 
cities in global competition “actually creates the powerlessness that it projects 
by contributing to the hegemony of prevailing globalization metaphors of 
capitalism‟s global reach, local penetration and placeless logic.” Id. at 58.  
Smith suggests instead that most economic relations are actually highly 
territorialized.  Id. at 58-59.  See also JANET ABU-LUGHOD, Comparing Chicago, 
New York and Los Angeles: Testing Some World City Hypotheses, in WORLD CITIES 
IN A WORLD SYSTEM  (Paul Knox & Peter Taylor eds., 1995);  Michael Storper, 
Territories, Flows and Hierarchies in the Global Economy, in SPACES OF 
GLOBALIZATION: REASSERTING THE POWER OF THE LOCAL (Kevin Cox ed., 
1997).  Focusing on the territoriality of economic relations, DeFilippis analyzes 
informal employment sectors that one might imagine to be vulnerable to inter-
municipal competition, such as domestic work, home health care, building 
services, restaurants, laundries, residential construction and garment 
manufacturing. James DeFilippis, On Globalization, Competition and Economic 
Justice in Cities, in SEARCHING FOR THE JUST CITY: DEBATES IN URBAN 
THEORY AND PRACTICE (Peter Marcuse et al. eds., 2009).  Of these industries, 
DeFilippis finds that only one is shaped directly by extra-local competition—
garment manufacturing.  The rest of these goods and services are all produced 
and consumed locally, leading DeFilippis to argue that the long term sources 
of economic injustice continue to be rooted in relationships between capital 
and labor within a given locality. 
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increasingly globalized, it is also increasingly regional, and regional 
reforms are required to maintain economic competitiveness.125  
Urban downtowns are often the engines of regional economic 
growth, and the economic well-being of suburban residents arguably 
depends on the health of central cities.126  More importantly, 
Edward Glaeser found in a national study of regional economic 
development that a flexible and varied housing supply was “the key 
determinant of regional growth.”127  Glaeser suggested, “[a] more 
regional approach to housing supply might reduce the tendency of 
many localities to block new construction” and in the process 
impose costly externalities on their neighbors.128 Not only is 
fragmentation problematic, but also inequality itself may further 
reduce economic growth as studies have found that those regions 
with greater income inequality have slower income and population 
growth as well as increased crime and decreased reports of 
happiness.129 
Regionalism in the United States has taken many forms, 
from elected regional governments to informal cooperation among 
municipalities.  The crucial question in regional governance is what 
powers exist at which level of government.  Thus, local governments 
and the benefits of local democracy can be maintained at the same 
time as limited powers important to metropolitan equity and 
efficiency are transferred to entities at a regional level.130  For 
                                                                                                       
125  Allan D. Wallis, Regions in Action: Crafting Regional Governance Under 
the Challenge of Global Competitiveness, NAT‟L CIVIC REV., Spring/Summer 1996, 
at 15-16.  See also NEIL BRENNER, NEW STATE SPACES: URBAN GOVERNANCE 
AND THE RESCALING OF STATEHOOD (2004); ANNALEE SAXENIAN, 
REGIONAL ADVANTAGE: CULTURE AND COMPETITION IN SILICON VALLEY 
AND ROUTE 128 (1996); MICHAEL STORPER, THE REGIONAL WORLD: 
TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY (1997). 
126  Richard Voith, Do Suburbs Need Cities?, 38 J. REG‟L SCI. 445, 462 
(1998) (finding statistically significant positive correlations between both 
suburban incomes‟ housing prices and the growth of income in the relevant 
central city); John A. Powell, Race and Space: What Really Drives Metropolitan 
Growth, BROOKINGS REV., Fall 1998, at 20-21 (“A failure to address central-
city problems affects the entire region adversely.  The failure to adopt regional 
strategies adversely affects the central cities.”).  
127  Edward Glaeser, Do Regional Economies Need Regional Coordination? 1 
(Harv. Inst. of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 2131, 2007), available at 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2007/HIER2131.pdf. 
128  Id. 
129  Edward L. Glaeser et al., Urban Inequality (Nat‟l Bureau of Econ. 
Research, Working Paper No. 14419, 2008) (on file with the Columbia Journal of 
Race and Law). 
130  Powell, supra note 126, at 21 (“We need a regional approach that 
gives cities or communities a way to maintain appropriate control of their 
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example, residents of Portland, Oregon, have created an elected 
regional government with land-use and transportation planning 
powers as well as responsibility for parks and civic amenities.131  
Similarly, building from the Minneapolis-St. Paul area‟s Twin Cities 
Metropolitan Council, Minnesota‟s “metropolitics” coalition in the 
state legislature enacted regional fair-share housing bills and regional 
revenue-sharing formulas to pool tax revenues from high-end 
housing.132 More often, regionalism takes the form of limited 
regional special purpose districts or ad hoc collaborative projects 
among municipalities.  Recently, advocates also have pointed toward 
the role of community-based organizations as agents of regional 
reform.133 
This diversity of approaches to regionalism fits with the 
federalist tradition of states and local governments as “laboratories 
of democracy” and allows varied responses to different regional 
contexts.  Regionalism does not guarantee equity and will not 
eliminate discrimination; regional bodies can also discriminate.  
Nevertheless, some problems are most effectively dealt with at the 
regional level. Residential segregation, foreclosure prevention, 
neighborhood stabilization, and inequalities between local 
governments are all interconnected issues that are best addressed 
regionally. 
 
VI. CHALLENGING ECONOMIC LOCALISM 
 
Addressing segregation requires more than new strategies 
for the enforcement of existing fair housing laws, although that 
remains an essential first step.  Confronting the conditions that led 
to the credit collapse requires more than new consumer protection 
regulations,134 although that is a crucial start.  Both require 
addressing the political and economic context of spatial segregation 
on the basis of race and class.  Both also require thinking creatively 
                                                                                                       
political and cultural institutions, while sharing in regional resources and 
balancing regional policymaking.”). 
131  Gerald E. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
1763, 1777-78 (2002); Carl Abbott, The Portland Region: Where City and Suburbs 
Talk to Each Other—and Often Agree, 8 HOUS. POL'Y DEBATE 11 (1997). 
132  MYRON ORFIELD, METROPOLITICS: A REGIONAL AGENDA FOR 
COMMUNITY AND STABILITY 104-55 (1997). 
133  Todd Swanstrom & Brian Banks, Going Regional: Community-Based 
Regionalism, Transportation, and Local Hiring Agreements, 28 J. PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 
355 (2009).  
134  See The Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. 
L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
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about the role of housing in the national economy and personal 
finances. 
Segregation continues to be entrenched by governance 
structures that are arguably unwise from a regional development 
perspective, but that are not illegal.  Thus, attention must be focused 
on the incentives that encourage segregation (such as fragmented 
local governments with strong land use powers, as well as taxation 
and financing structures that encourage speculation in real property), 
and contrasting incentives that can encourage collaboration among 
municipalities within a region and foster more equitable 
development. 
Many urban actors seemingly have given up on advocating 
for regionalism given its complicated implications for democratic 
participation and the often entrenched opposition from wealthy 
suburban voters.135 But the high foreclosure rate and the 
tremendous economic dislocation of the foreclosure crisis may 
provide new opportunities for regional collaboration regarding 
metropolitan housing markets.  The steep decrease in home values 
and rise in abandonment create new opportunities for 
municipalities, community development corporations (CDCs), and 
community development financial institutions (CDFIs) to work 
together to acquire properties at a discount, rehabilitate them, and 
preserve them as homes that are permanently affordable in a form 
that can help stabilize distressed neighborhoods. 
 
                                                                                                       
135 While regional approaches to public policy have widespread 
support among urban planners and many public policy analysts, it has also 
faced significant opposition. Regionalism engages inherently with the question 
of the right scale for government, small enough for citizens to have an impact 
on decision-making but large enough for those decisions to have an effect on 
social issues. Larger regional governments are criticized for reducing citizen 
participation and government responsiveness. Regionalism also faces the 
daunting hurdle of entrenched local government bureaucracies and the 
tremendous investments that wealthy municipalities have in continuing to 
exclude others and control resources. See BRIFFAULT & REYNOLDS, supra note 
122.  If one could claim a recent heyday for regionalism, it seems to have been 
in the last decade of the last century, as mayors, state legislators, architects, 
legal academics, and public intellectuals published books and articles pressing 
the regional agenda. PETER CALTHORPE & WILLIAM FULTON, THE REGIONAL 
CITY: PLANNING FOR THE END OF SPRAWL (2001); ANTHONY DOWNS, NEW 
VISIONS FOR METROPOLITAN AMERICA (1994); GERALD FRUG, CITY 
MAKING: BUILDING COMMUNITIES WITHOUT WALLS (1999); ORFIELD, supra 
note 132; DAVID RUSK, CITIES WITHOUT SUBURBS (1993); REFLECTIONS ON 
REGIONALISM (Bruce Katz ed., 2000); Briffault, Our Localsim, supra note 117. 
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A. Regional Experimentation in Foreclosure Prevention 
 
Unprecedented numbers of foreclosures have hit both city 
centers and suburban areas and the effects of increasing 
abandonment and vacancies are only beginning to be felt.  The 
destabilizing effects of subprime lending and foreclosures on 
homeownership and on home values have not been confined to 
neighborhoods of color but have affected surrounding white and 
mixed-race neighborhoods as well.136 
While suburban municipalities sometimes have a brighter 
fiscal outlook than large central cities, suburbs often lack the civic 
infrastructure, particularly the network of housing nonprofits and 
government agencies with experience in housing policy, which is 
required to prevent foreclosures and minimize the neighborhood 
impact when they do occur.137  Abandoned properties impose 
significant direct costs on local governments that become 
responsible for securing and maintaining them, and they have 
destructive effects on neighborhood safety and quality of life.  At 
the same time, the diffuse nature of the ownership of many of these 
properties and the legal challenges in acquiring clear title requires a 
skill-set that is difficult and time-consuming for those unfamiliar 
with the process to develop.  Further, it can be especially challenging 
for community development corporations or city agencies to acquire 
financing to buy properties in foreclosure at a time when housing 
values continue to decline.  Finally, the skills to quickly redevelop 
abandoned and deteriorated units in an affordable and equitable 
manner are both crucial and difficult to find. 
An effective response depends on these strong 
infrastructures of linked public, private, and nonprofit housing and 
community development actors.  The need for these infrastructures 
is a significant impetus for collaboration, especially between central 
cities, declining inner-ring suburbs, and rapidly developing low-tax 
capacity exurbs.138 
                                                                                                       
136  Jenny Schuetz et al., Neighborhood Effects of Concentrated Mortgage 
Foreclosures, 17 J. HOUS. ECON. 306 (2008). 
137  Todd Swanstrom et al., Regional Resilience in the Face of Foreclosures: 
Evidence from Six Metropolitan Areas (Macarthur Found. Research Network on 
Bldg. Resilient Regions, Working Paper No. 2009-05, 2009), available at 
http://metrostudies.berkeley.edu/pubs/reports/2009-05.pdf. 
138  For the definition of exurb, see Arthur C. Nelson & Kenneth J. 
Dueker, The Exurbanization of America and Its Planning Policy Implications, 9 J. 
PLAN. EDUC. & RES. 91, 93 (1990) (noting dictionary definition of an exurb as 
„a region, generally semi-rural, beyond the suburbs of a city, inhabited largely 
by persons in the upper income group . . . [and an exurbanite as] a person 
  
103 INNOVATIVE RESPONSES TO FORECLOSURES Vol. 1:1 
 
 
Over the past two years, the federal government has 
allocated almost six billion dollars to the Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program (NSP) to provide emergency assistance to state and local 
governments in acquiring and redeveloping foreclosed properties 
that otherwise might become sources of abandonment and blight.139  
The financing can be used by local governments to purchase 
foreclosed or abandoned homes and to rehabilitate, resell, or 
redevelop these homes in order to stabilize neighborhoods and stem 
the decline of house values.  The funding available to local 
governments through the NSP could catalyze efforts both to 
explore alternative homeownership structures and to create new 
incentives for regional cooperation. 
In neighborhoods that were formerly flooded with high-cost 
financial products, individual buyers and non-profit developers now 
face obstacles accessing conventional financing for the acquisition 
and redevelopment of housing, even if the projects have sufficient 
equity or public subsidy.  Given the limited access to conventional 
financing, distressed properties then will often be purchased by 
speculative, absentee, “all cash” investors unlikely to make quality 
repairs and invest in the neighborhood for the long-term, thereby 
leading to further neighborhood deterioration and further decreases 
in regional home values.  This situation means that public 
investment in the targeted neighborhoods is essential to stabilize 
them, connect them to streams of finance from CDFIs or other 
lenders, and reconnect them with the comparatively stronger 
regional labor and housing markets. 
                                                                                                       
living in an exurb, especially one commuting to the city as a business or 
professional person‟ ”) (internal citations omitted). Such an alliance of working 
and middle-class neighborhoods within a region can also undertake joint 
legislative efforts for regional property tax sharing and a redirection of 
government infrastructure spending from the wealthiest neighborhoods on the 
urban fringe to those neighborhoods most affected by foreclosures. See also 
ORFIELD, supra note 132. 
139  The Neighborhood Stabilization Program was initially established 
by the Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-289, 
122 Stat. 2654 (2008), with a $3.92 billion allocation and expanded in the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (2009), with a further $2 billion. The funding can be used for the 
establishment of financing mechanisms for the purchase of foreclosed homes, 
the purchase and rehabilitation of abandoned or foreclosed homes, land 
banking of foreclosed homes, demolition of blighted structures, and 
redevelopment of vacant or demolished property. Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program funding, however, has been dwarfed by the seventy-five billion dollar 
Making Home Affordable program, which largely reinforces the status quo by 
giving lenders money to incentivize them to modify existing loans. 
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1. Cross-Border Collaboration in the NSP140 
 
The City of Newark, New Jersey and many of its 
surrounding suburbs have been creating innovative regional public-
private collaborations to address foreclosures since before the credit 
crisis began in earnest.  Conscious of the rising foreclosure rate, the 
city worked with Essex County, neighboring municipalities, and 
non-profit organizations from throughout the metropolitan area in 
the fall of 2007 and created a foreclosure prevention taskforce.  The 
taskforce worked on a range of foreclosure issues, from homebuyer 
counseling to foreclosure prevention to mitigating the impact of 
foreclosures on neighborhood quality of life. 
The partners who had begun working together in the 
foreclosure prevention taskforce decided to prepare a joint 
application to HUD for the second round of NSP funding in 2009.  
The application included the City of Newark, Essex County, the 
City of East Orange, the City of Irvington, the City of Montclair, 
and the Township of Orange, as well as eight community-based 
organizations, three housing developers, and the Community Loan 
Fund of New Jersey.  The partners recognized that the housing 
markets in Newark and the surrounding towns and suburbs are 
closely intertwined and that the foreclosure crisis is truly a regional 
problem.  Furthermore, many of the towns and suburbs realized 
that they did not have a strong chance of winning significant 
resources in the application process unless they collaborated with 
Newark, while Newark felt that submitting a regional application 
would make the submission more competitive.141  While the 
partnership does not necessarily bridge the gap to include higher-
income, predominantly white exurbs to which many white former 
Newark residents had moved decades before, the partnership 
between an inner-city, a number of its surrounding suburbs, and the 
wealthy surrounding county still highlights the ways in which urban 
and suburban municipalities within a metropolitan region can 
benefit from regional cooperation.142 
                                                                                                       
140  The author obtained the information contained in this section 
relating to the Neighborhood Stabilization Program (NSP) through in-person 
interviews with Stephanie Greenwood on February 21, 2010 and October 20, 
2010.  See generally Interview with Stephanie Greenwood, Cmty. Dev. Manager, 
Newark Dep‟t of Econ. & Hous. Dev., in Newark, N.J. (Feb. 21, 2010, Oct. 
20, 2010) (on file with the Columbia Journal of Race and Law). 
141  Id. at 4. 
142  Essex County is a relatively affluent county with average 
household incomes of $69,232 in 2007, compared to a national average of 
$63,211. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, AMERICAN COMMUNITY SURVEY 2006-2008,  
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The partners appreciated the need to target strategically the 
limited financial resources to maximize their impact and felt that a 
comprehensive approach to neighborhood development could 
support housing rehabilitation with public infrastructure investment 
and connections to employment and training initiatives.  To target 
the resources effectively, the partners identified those census tracts 
where high levels of foreclosures and abandonment overlapped with 
the presence of an established community organization that could 
oversee the rehabilitation process and locations where the public 
efforts could realistically leverage further public and private 
investment to multiply their effect.143  Several of the eleven 
neighborhoods selected crossed municipal lines, further highlighting 
the reality that the problem and its solutions are regional in 
nature.144 
The collaboration has brought significant benefits to the 
partners, from increased ability to access resources to increased 
capability to recognize shared problems and draw on a broader skills 
base to address them.  For instance, suburban non-profits and 
housing developers seeking to leverage the NSP funds to access 
other financing have been drawing on the expertise of urban groups 
that are more accustomed to piecing together financing for 
affordable housing rehabilitation from multiple sources.145  The 
collaboration also has opened space for discussion about the distrust 
                                                                                                       
available at http://factfinder.census.gov/home/saff/main.html?_lang=en.  
Nevertheless, it has been significantly affected by the foreclosure crisis, not 
primarily because of speculative over-development but because of subprime 
and predatory lending, which are often targeted at middle-class African 
American communities with significant home equity.  Sixty percent of all 
mortgage originations in the NSP targeted neighborhoods between 2005 and 
2007 were high-cost, subprime loans. Newark/Essex NSP2 Consortium, 
Neighborhood Stabilization Program II Application, 1 (2009), http://www.ci.newark.  
nj.us/userimages/downloads/nsp2_NSP2Application.pdf (based on an 
unpublished analysis of Home Mortgage Disclosure Act data by Assistant 
Professor Katherine Newman, Edward J. Bloustein School of Planning and 
Public Policy, Rutgers University). By 2009, more than one-quarter of the 
subprime loans originated in these neighborhoods between 2005 and 2007 
were already in foreclosure.  Id. at 1. While it is neighborhoods like these with 
large numbers of high-cost refinancings that have been hardest hit, rising 
unemployment and declining home values mean that foreclosures are 
increasingly spreading to more affluent suburbs, creating even more of an 
impetus for regional collaboration.  
143  Newark/Essex NSP2 Consortium, Neighborhood Stabilization 
Program II Application Overview, 4 (2007), http://www.ci.newark.nj.us/user 
images/downloads/nsp2_NSP_II_Application_Overview.pdf. 
144  Greenwood, supra note 140, at 4. 
145  Id. at 4-5. 
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that has existed between governments within the region, where 
smaller towns sometimes feel that Newark consumes a 
disproportionate share of state resources and does not consult with 
neighbors on projects of shared interest.146  Closer relationships 
among local leaders has enabled the sharing of data and of best 
practices and has laid the groundwork for a richer understanding of 
the regional housing market as well as opportunities for collective 
responses. 
One of these collective responses has been the ability of 
municipalities to learn from each other in making use of new 
legislation such as the state-wide Abandoned Properties 
Rehabilitation Act,147 which allows municipalities to take vacant 
properties in need of rehabilitation into receivership and redevelop 
them as affordable or workforce housing.  Newark has taken the 
lead in using this statute to address abandoned buildings and 
transform them into affordable housing, and neighboring towns 
have been meeting with Newark officials to learn how to use the 
statute in their towns.148 
In trying to take advantage of the down-market period to 
preserve affordable housing, municipalities are looking into creating 
land banks and community land trusts to purchase sites for 
affordable housing, until the housing market returns to previous 
levels.  Municipalities are buying these sites in order to prevent 
speculators from buying up and sitting on properties that then could 
become neighborhood hazards.  Similarly, in situations where there 
are a number of abandoned properties in a small radius, which are 
owned by the same bank and which have been foreclosed on, local 
governments are investigating options for low-rise, scattered-site, 
limited-equity, cooperative housing.149 
                                                                                                       
146  Id. at 3-4. 
147  N.J. STAT. ANN. § 55:19-98 (West 2003) (effective Jan. 8, 2004) 
(empowering municipalities to seek possession of abandoned property through 
the courts after giving the owner the opportunity to rehabilitate the abandoned 
property, granting municipalities recourse to recover funds spent for repairs or 
demolition from any other assets of the owners, and defining an “abandoned 
property” as any property that has not been legally occupied for six months 
and is either (a) in need of rehabilitation, (b) uncompleted, (c) in tax arrears, or 
(d) determined to be a nuisance). 
148  Greenwood, supra note 140, at 5 (noting that the threat of 
condemnation also has been effective in forcing owners to come forward and 
fix other abandoned properties threatened with condemnation).  See also ALAN 
MALLACH, BRINGING BUILDINGS BACK:  FROM ABANDONED PROPERTIES TO 
COMMUNITY ASSETS (2006). 
149  Greenwood, supra note 140, at 6.  
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2. Discounted Bulk Purchases of Distressed Notes for 
Affordable Housing 
 
Another innovative example of regional collaboration 
related to the Essex County foreclosure prevention taskforce has 
been the successful effort by leaders of state-wide housing 
intermediaries, local CDCs, and a local CDFI to create a new model 
for foreclosure response:  the Community Asset Preservation 
Corporation (CAPC).  CAPC is a non-profit organization created to 
stabilize neighborhoods by buying distressed notes in bulk from 
lenders and then assisting existing homeowners to preserve their 
assets and financial integrity by avoiding foreclosure while also 
returning vacant foreclosed properties to productive and affordable 
reuse in an efficient and equitable manner.150 
Local community developers and housing experts saw two 
significant obstacles to effective community revitalization:  1) the 
lack of accessible and flexible capital available for the strategic 
acquisition and redevelopment of properties in the foreclosure 
process, and 2) a lack of capacity in local CDCs to take advantage of 
a bulk-purchase strategy in order to rapidly acquire, develop, and 
return to use properties scattered throughout the region.151  In 
response, the group conceived and designed CAPC, partnered with 
an experienced local CDC, and approached JPMorgan Chase to 
negotiate over the bulk purchase of a portfolio of forty-seven non-
performing mortgages at a steep discount.152  A statewide CDFI, 
New Jersey Community Capital, contributed fifty-two percent of the 
equity and the partner CDC committed the remainder, supporting a 
total project 80/20 debt-to-equity ratio.153  Approximately seventy 
percent of the ninety-three units are currently being developed into 
affordable rental or homeownership opportunities, and CAPC has 
already been able to pay down $1 million of the $3.6 million in debt 
for the project ahead of schedule.154 
                                                                                                       
150  Community Asset Preservation Corporation, Application to the 
National Community Stabilization Trust REO Capital Fund for Acquisition 
and Rehabilitation Financing, 3 (on file with the Columbia Journal of Race and 
Law). 
151  Id. at 1-2. 
152  Harold Simon, The Community Asset Preservation Corporation: A New 
Approach to Community Revitalization, in REO AND VACANT PROPERTIES:  
STRATEGIES FOR NEIGHBORHOOD STABILIZATION 123 (Fed. Reserve Bank of 
Boston, Fed. Reserve Bank of Cleveland & Fed. Reserve Bd. eds., 2010). 
153  Id. at 127. 
154  Id. 
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CAPC drew on regional and state-wide resources and 
partnered an experienced CDFI with capable CDCs.  As a result, 
CAPC was able to evaluate carefully the rehabilitation costs and exit 
strategies for the properties, secure flexible financing, and negotiate 
a steeply discounted bulk purchase price that would enable the 
majority of the properties to be sold or rented to low and moderate 
income households.  CAPC then was able to bring the project to 
fruition by acquiring clear title and renovating the units or 
transferring them to responsible redevelopers.155 
Both the Newark and CAPC experiences are examples of 
municipalities, CDFIs, and CDCs collaborating to engage residents 
and address foreclosures regionally.  While housing markets are 
regional, the competence and capacity to respond to foreclosures are 
concentrated in urban areas, even as the need to open up affordable 
housing opportunities exists in suburban areas.  Responses to 
foreclosures present an opportunity to enhance both equity and 
efficiency through regional collaboration.  While not without 
challenges,156 discounted bulk purchases of distressed notes spread 
throughout a region encourage regional collaboration across the 
public and private nonprofit sectors, and they create affordable 
scattered-site housing that opens up new opportunities to challenge 
segregation.  In order to maximize the value of the equity invested 
and make these housing opportunities permanently affordable, more 
can be done to experiment with alternative forms of tenure as well. 
 
B. Shared-Equity Homeownership Structures 
 
As the Newark example shows, creative thinking about 
neighborhood stabilization creates the potential to pilot shared-
equity ownership structures.  For example, limited equity housing 
cooperatives and community land trusts could return the focus on 
housing to its role as a home and as part of a neighborhood, not as 
an investment vehicle.  The foreclosure crisis has highlighted the 
need in the market for both intermediary steps between renting and 
owning as well as more supportive ownership structures.  Shared 
equity housing that intermediates between individual buyers and the 
property can fill these needs. 
                                                                                                       
155  Community Asset Preservation Corporation, supra note 150, at 5. 
156  Challenges raised by the CAPC example include the difficulty of 
quickly negotiating a competitive purchase price, the obstacles to rehabilitating 
buildings across a widely scattered area, and the limited impact such dispersed 
efforts have on the stabilization of any one neighborhood. 
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1. Rethinking Dominant Homeownership Models 
 
Emblematic of the sea change in popular attitudes, a recent 
Time Magazine cover entitled “The Case Against Homeownership” 
emphasizes the negatives aspects of homeownership.157  As the 
article pointed out, homeownership has been promoted and 
subsidized by the government for ideological reasons during a 
period extending from the Cold War, when Franklin Roosevelt told 
the nation that a country of homeowners was “unconquerable,” to 
the 1990‟s when George H.W. Bush‟s Secretary of Housing and 
Urban Development, Jack Kemp, suggested that homeownership 
could “save babies, save children, save families and save 
America.”158  This ideological trend continued through George W. 
Bush‟s more recent promotion of homeownership as part of the 
“ownership society.”159  As historian Robert Self has argued, 
[T]he detached, single-family home ha[s] been elevated 
in popular culture as the preeminent symbol of both 
independence and assimilation.  Together, markets and 
culture—and later, electoral politics—encouraged 
homeowners . . . to identify property ownership first 
and foremost in terms of their own individual financial 
interests . . . . [H]omeownership stood at the core of 
political identification, and small property holders 
emerged as the most important social class and political 
constituency.160 
In The Washington Post, however, veteran business journalist Robert J. 
Samuelson recently went so far as to argue that “[t]he relentless 
promotion of homeownership as the embodiment of the American 
dream has outlived its usefulness.”161 
The commoditization of housing after the Second World 
War was essential to the creation of a middle-class and to the 
                                                                                                       




160  SELF, supra note 15, at 99. 
161  Robert J. Samuelson, How a Homeownership Fetish Hurt the American 
Dream, WASH. POST, Aug. 23, 2010, at A13. See also Georgette Chapman 
Phillips, An Urban Slice of Apple Pie: Rethinking Homeownership in U.S. Cities, 24 
NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL‟Y 187 (2010); A. Mechele Dickerson, 
The Myth of Home Ownership and Why Home Ownership Is Not Always a Good Thing, 
84 IND. L.J. 189 (2009). 
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solidification of racial identifications and boundaries.162  Indeed, 
racial segregation cannot be truly addressed without challenging the 
understandable societal fixation on property values and the 
attendant policies of exclusionary zoning. 
The role of speculative profit is central to the current 
housing market crisis and to the perpetuation of segregation, and it 
has been raised directly in one of the class action suits against 
lenders.  In Miller v. Countrywide Bank, Countrywide argued in its 
defense “that the complaint boils down to a claim that Countrywide 
should not be able to have a policy of selling its product for what 
people will pay for it after negotiating in the shadow of market 
forces.”163  Judge Gertner, denying Countrywide‟s motion to 
dismiss, found the “ „market forces‟ argument troubling.  It is 
precisely because the market could not self-correct for 
discrimination that statutes like Title VII, the FHA, and ECOA 
were necessary.  The market, after all, traditionally valued „individual 
preferences,‟ even when those preferences derived from racial and 
gender-based stereotypes.”164  A leading legal scholar in the field, 
Robert Schwemm, similarly argues that “[s]o long as our home-
finance system relies primarily on profit-seeking lenders, it is naïve 
to believe that these firms will voluntarily put a high value on 
conforming with civil rights laws if discrimination appears to offer 
the prospect of more profits.”165 
Wrestling with the market forces that make discrimination 
profitable requires reconsideration of the economic and racial 
divisions entrenched in taken-for-granted municipal boundaries, as 
well as the role of housing in personal and public finance.166  As 
                                                                                                       
162  SELF, supra note 15, at 98-99. Self writes, “The most significant 
political, economic, and spatial transformation in the postwar United States 
was the overdevelopment of suburbs and the underdevelopment of cities.  As 
ostensible signifiers of this transformation, „white flight‟ and „urban decline‟ 
mask volatile and protracted social and political struggles over land, taxes, jobs, 
and public policy . . . .” Id. at 1.  Although white suburban residents may have 
been “diverse in class background and place of origin, . . . the structure of the 
housing markets into which they entered in the postwar decades would begin 
to give them a common identity, to shape for them a set of concerns and 
interest that would unite more than divide them.” Id. at 98. 
163  Miller v. Countrywide Bank, N.A., 571 F. Supp. 2d 251, 257 (D. 
Mass. 2008). 
164  Id. at 258 (citations omitted). 
165  Schwemm & Taren, supra note 28, at 432. 
166  See Peter Marcuse & Emily Achtenberg, Towards the 
Decommodification of Housing: A Political Analysis and a Progressive Program, in 
CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING (Rachel Bratt et al. eds., 1986).  It is 
also relevant to point out that housing is not like most other commodities in 
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Newark and other regions have been exploring, low property values 
create an opportunity to use shared-equity forms of tenure to deliver 
the benefits of homeownership, such as security of tenure, while 
also creating durable affordability and reducing the speculation 
involved in housing markets.  With wider acceptance of the idea that 
owning a home is not primarily a speculative profit-making venture 
but instead can be a safe investment in a personal and social good 
consumed over a long period of time, such alternative tenures can 
deliver both greater affordability and security for owners, as well as 
increased race and class diversity in neighborhoods.167 
 
2. Land-Trusts and Durable Affordability 
 
Land trusts make housing more affordable in the long term 
by removing the cost of land from the housing price.  While 
continuing to own the land in the trust, land trusts provide for the 
private use of a parcel through long-term ground lease agreements 
that give the homeowner exclusive access and use rights, but they 
limit resale rights to ensure that the home remains affordable and is 
sold to qualified low- or moderate-income buyers.168  While 
formulas for calculating resale values in shared-equity structures 
vary, most allow owners to get back what they invested in the 
property at the time of the purchase along with improvements they 
made.  Additionally, they recover a share of the appreciation in value 
(which is frequently linked to an index of low-income households‟ 
buying power such as the area median income, thus tying housing 
price appreciation to rises in income). 
There are currently more than two hundred community land 
trusts in operation in thirty-one states across the country, with 
thousands of affordable homeownership units in a mix of single and 
multi-family buildings.169  As cities have watched prior investments 
in affordable housing through local, state, and federal subsidies 
expire, land trusts are increasingly appealing as a way to guarantee 
                                                                                                       
that it is fixed, durable, costly, lacks transparency, involves high-transaction 
costs, and, most importantly, has tremendous social and economic 
externalities. 
167  Rick Jacobus & Michael Brown, City Hall Steps In, 
SHELTERFORCE, Spring 2007, http://www.nhi.org/online/issues/149/cityhall.  
html. 
168  Julie Farrell Curtin & Lance Bocarsly, CLTs: A Growing Trend in 
Affordable Homeownership, 17 J. AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 367, 370 
(2008). 
169  Emily Thaden & Greg Rosenberg, Outperforming the Market: 
Delinquency and Foreclosure Rates in Community Land Trusts, LAND LINES, Oct. 
2010, at 2, 4; see also Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 168. 
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permanent affordability.170  As a result, a diverse range of cities, 
including Cincinnati, Ohio, Irvine, California, and Chicago, Illinois, 
have formed land trusts as part of their housing development 
strategies.171 
 
3. Land Trusts and Neighborhood Stability 
 
One significant advantage of community land trusts is their 
ability to increase neighborhood stability, both because of their 
community development mission and because of their robust 
support systems for first-time homeowners.  Land trusts stabilize 
local economies by purchasing vacant land and building or 
renovating affordable homes.  At the same time, land trusts also 
build household assets by working with homebuyers to secure the 
financial resources necessary to afford and maintain 
homeownership, and they foster community engagement by creating 
forums through which land trust homeowners can participate in the 
governance of the trust and the development of the broader 
community.172 
Evidence of community land trusts‟ ability to foster 
neighborhood stability is demonstrated by the fact that their lessees 
have outperformed the market by a wide margin in delinquencies 
and foreclosures during the housing crisis, despite supporting 
predominantly low and moderate income households.  The National 
Delinquency Survey conducted by the Mortgage Bankers 
Association reported that 30.6% of subprime loans and 7% of prime 
loans were seriously delinquent in 2009.173  By contrast, a national 
survey of community land trusts reported that only 1.6% of loans on 
community land trust units were delinquent.174  Similarly, the 
Mortgage Bankers Association reported 15.6% of subprime loans in 
foreclosure and 3.3% of prime loans in foreclosure in 2009 as 
compared with less than 0.6% of loans on community land trust 
units in foreclosure.175 
                                                                                                       
170  David Abromowitz, Community Land Trusts and Ground Leases, 1 J. 
AFFORDABLE HOUS. & CMTY. DEV. L. 5, 5 (1992). 
171  Curtin & Bocarsly, supra note 168, at 371; Jacobus & Brown, supra 
note 167. 
172  Jeff Corey, A Model for All Markets?, SHELTERFORCE, Fall/Winter 
2009, http://www.shelterforce.org/article/a_model_for_all_markets/a_model 
_for_all_markets. 
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Due to the fact that community land trusts make 
homeownership more affordable and ensure that households spend 
no more than thirty to forty percent of their income on housing 
costs, land trust homes are significantly less likely to become 
delinquent.  Land trusts also outperform the market because of the 
stewardship practices in which they engage, including pre-purchase 
education on homeownership for homebuyers, post-purchase 
opportunities for education in financial literacy, support in finding 
contractors and managing repairs, and contractual provisions 
limiting high-cost refinancing loans.176  Finally, if homeowners do 
become delinquent on loans, CLTs often intervene to help by 
contacting lenders, providing financial counseling, or even by 
lending emergency funds to prevent foreclosure.177 
As Duncan Kennedy has argued, in shared-equity 
homeownership structures “[t]he point is not just to help people 
move up through the market system, but also to counter the 
tendency of the market to generate, through the combination of 
employment instability, neighborhood instability, and the various 
forms of race and class discrimination, an endlessly renewed sector 
of urban misery.”178 
 
4. Expanding Shared-Equity Opportunities 
 
Expanding the diversity of housing options that households 
at all income levels can access by growing the shared-equity sector 
can contribute both to increasing housing opportunities and 
strengthening neighborhood stability.  A first step in that direction is 
investigating and sharing best practices in the variety of shared-
equity models such as community land trusts, limited equity 
cooperatives, and other deed-restricted affordable tenures.  
Identifying and sharing best practices can contribute to increased 
standardization and make it easier for land trusts and for 
homeowners to access capital from both private lenders and public 
funders.179 
The most exciting recent development for shared-equity 
housing has been increased interest from city and county 
                                                                                                       
176  Thaden & Rosenberg, supra note 169, at 3, 6. 
177  Id. at 2-7. 
178  Duncan Kennedy, The Limited Equity Coop As a Vehicle for 
Affordable Housing in a Race and Class Divided Society, 46 HOW. L.J. 85, 91 (2002).  
179  John Emmeus Davis, Toward a Common Agenda: Growing Shared-
Equity Housing, SHELTERFORCE, Spring 2007, http://www.shelterforce.org/ 
article/680/toward_a_common_agenda/. 
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governments.   Public support is essential to creating a more tolerant 
climate for shared or limited equity structures, especially in creating 
valuation systems that tax limited equity housing fairly in ways that 
represent their limited resale value. Participation by local 
governments also can contribute some of the capital necessary to 
start community land trusts and bring them to scale.  As previous 
subsidies and affordability restrictions have begun to expire, local 
governments are recognizing the wisdom of creating durable long-
term affordability in ways that retain the subsidies.  They are also 
recognizing the unique benefits shared equity housing provides to 
neighborhoods and individual owners particularly in terms of 
affordability, which is preserved for subsequent generations, and 
stability, which derives from stewardship programs that pool risks, 
share responsibilities, and increase the odds that first-time 
homebuyers succeed and flourish. 
Two recent examples of city participation in community 
land trusts are from Irvine, California and Chicago, Illinois.  In 2005, 
the Irvine City Council created a housing task force led by the 
mayor which has set a goal for the city to develop 9,700 units of 
new affordable housing under the stewardship of a municipally-
sponsored CLT.  Similarly, in 2006, the mayor and city council in 
Chicago created a city-wide, municipally-sponsored land trust with 
the goal of adding 250 units to the trust annually in locations spread 
throughout the city.180  Since their formation, both trusts have 
acquired land, developed housing, sold affordable homes to 
qualified buyers, and continued to grow.181 
By highlighting the ways in which the current system of 
housing regulation is not functioning, the current crisis presents a 
number of opportunities to address the root causes of the housing 
bubble, including segregation and speculation.  Any solution must 
create regional structures to bring together fragmented governments 
and their financing.  A truly long-term solution also should explore 
alternative homeownership structures that reduce the 
commoditization of housing and reorient our focus towards its 
social benefits.182 
 
                                                                                                       
180  Jacobus & Brown, supra note 167. 
181  Id. 
182  See, e.g., DEFILIPPIS, supra note 124; MICHAEL HARLOE, THE 
PEOPLE‟S HOME: SOCIAL RENTED HOUSING IN EUROPE AND AMERICA 
(1995); CRITICAL PERSPECTIVES ON HOUSING, supra note 166; A RIGHT TO 
HOUSING: FOUNDATION FOR A NEW SOCIAL AGENDA, supra note 20. 
  





The problem of segregation is not primarily that people 
desire to live and associate with others for whom they feel an 
affinity, but rather that through segregation, certain groups establish 
material privilege, perpetuate social and economic hierarchies, and 
maintain political exclusion.183  Regions can counteract this process 
by bringing localities together to create fair distributions of 
affordable housing, pool resources and expertise to create equitable 
public education, and take strong stands against housing 
discrimination.  In these ways, regions can contribute to a climate in 
which strangers with diverging loyalties, diverse local affinities, and 
different priorities recognize that they live together in a shared 
metropolitan region with shared responsibilities.  Restructuring local 
governance in ways that both highlight and address the shared 
responsibilities within regions and reduce the existing incentives for 
segregation can help develop a much-needed sense of solidarity 
among neighbors. 
As the name apartheid suggests, the South African 
government used spatial segregation as a central tool to maintain 
white supremacy.  Recognizing the ways in which municipal 
fragmentation perpetuated economic inequality, the South African 
liberation struggle popularized the slogan “One City, One Tax Base” 
to demand metropolitan integration and tax base sharing.184  
Township residents organized rent and service payment boycotts to 
give expression to the slogan and speed the fall of the white 
supremacist government. 
Recognizing that the definition of local government 
boundaries fundamentally shapes access to opportunity, South 
Africa‟s first democratically-elected government undertook a 
national effort to redesign local government boundaries and 
responsibilities in light of both historic inequalities and current 
social and political relationships.185  The national effort concluded 
that local governments are the basis for equitable and just 
metropolitan areas and that strategic land-use planning and regional 
                                                                                                       
183  IRIS MARION YOUNG, INCLUSION AND DEMOCRACY 218 (2002). 
184  MARINA OTTAWAY, SOUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW 
ORDER 114-31 (1993); Richard Tomlinson et al., The Postapartheid Struggle for an 
Integrated Johannesburg, in EMERGING JOHANNESBURG: PERSPECTIVES ON THE 
POSTAPARTHEID CITY 3, 8-14 (Richard Tomlinson et al. eds., 2003). 
185  Robert Cameron, Local Government Boundary Reorganization, in 
DEMOCRACY AND DELIVERY: URBAN POLICY IN SOUTH AFRICA 76 (Udesh 
Pillay et al. eds., 2006). 
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development frameworks are crucial for economic and social 
development.186 
After the civil rights movement in the United States, 
however, local government boundaries and responsibilities were not 
reconsidered systematically.  Generally, local government structures 
and boundaries are often assumed to be fixed, but in reality, they are 
frequently changing.  Even in the United States, boundaries are 
more fluid than we often imagine.  Local government boundaries in 
the United States are changed most often not to realize more 
equitable distributions of government resources but, rather, to 
perpetuate the local economic and political status quo through 
processes such as “defensive incorporation.”187  Conversely, efforts 
to change municipal boundaries in order to achieve more equitable 
sharing of the tax-base have been struck down in the courts.188  To 
lay the groundwork for improved housing markets and increased 
access to opportunity, the federal government should collaborate 
with states and municipalities to undertake a systematic 
reconsideration of existing structures of local government, which 
could enhance local democracy and economic growth 
simultaneously. 
Soon after taking office, President Obama created the White 
House Office of Urban Affairs and highlighted a regional approach 
as one of the guiding principles of its efforts.  While the role of the 
Office of Urban Affairs thus far has been muted, it could and 
should lead a dynamic effort to support innovative local housing 
financing efforts, such as community land trusts, and to spread 
lessons from regional cooperation between cities and suburbs that 
can simultaneously enhance economic productivity and equity.  This 
kind of effort by the Office can play a crucial role in learning from 
local creativity and spreading these successes across the country in 
the true spirit of federalism‟s laboratories of democracy. 
                                                                                                       
186  Id. at 80. 
187  Defensive incorporation describes the actions of unincorporated 
areas, often wealthy, predominantly white areas, which incorporate to prevent 
annexation by another entity, often a neighboring urban area.  See, e.g., Green 
v. Tucson, 340 F.3d 891 (9th Cir. 2003) (rejecting constitutional challenges to 
an Arizona law seeking to limit defensive incorporation by requiring new 
incorporations within a minimum distance from existing municipalities to 
obtain their consent). 
188  See e.g., Bunch v. City of Jackson, 691 So. 2d 978 (Miss. 1997) 
(prohibiting the City of Jackson‟s proposed annexation of neighboring 
unincorporated land as unfair and unreasonable and suggesting it was 
motivated by a desire to increase the City‟s tax base). 
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As a significant political and economic liability for the 
United States, segregation fosters inequality and economic crisis.  
The collaborations in Essex County accessing joint funding, 
developing common principles, sharing data, disseminating best 
practices, and conducting public education demonstrate ways in 
which metropolitan partnerships can benefit both urban and 
suburban residents and make possible regional public policy 
innovations.  The unprecedented number of foreclosures and high 
rate of unemployment in areas across the country serve as a 
reminder that housing and labor are regional markets and that 
metropolitan collaboration is necessary to address neighborhood 
stabilization.  The realization of potential social and economic gains 
that arise from more truly open access to housing can be an integral 
part of the national recovery from the current economic crisis. 
 
